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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 920395-CA 
v. : Priority No. 16 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : District Court No. 874904967 
Defendant- Appellant : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESPONDENT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-3(g) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
This action involves the appeal of an Order Finding Defendant 
(Appellant) in Contempt and Imposing Jail Sentence and Judgment 
signed and entered June 19, 1992, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed on June 24, 1992. No cross-appeal has been filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Should substantial portions of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief be 
disregarded because they relate to events and claims which 
allegedly occurred after the entry of the Order from which this 
appeal is taken? 
II. Did the trial court properly find Dr. Osguthorpe in contempt 
of its previous order and impose proper sanctions upon him for such 
contempt? 
III. Can this Court consider Dr. Osguthorpe!s claim of error 
related to an order awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe certain attorney's 
fees and costs, when no appeal has been taken in connection with 
that order? 
IV. Is Mrs. Osguthorpe entitled to be awarded all of her 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by her in defending this appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
As to those portions of Appellant's Brief which address and 
argue events, hearings, incidents, and orders which occurred after 
June 19, 1992, the provisions of Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure are controlling and determinative. 
Those Rules provide in pertinent part: 
RULE 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(1) Filing appeal from final orders and 
judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district, juvenile, or circuit court to the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal from all final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial 
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
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does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is ground only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the 
award of attorney fees. 
RULE 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(1) Appeal from final judgment and 
order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an Order signed by the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson on June 19, 1992, imposing a jail sentence and judgment 
on Appellant. That Order resulted from an earlier Order dated 
January 24, 1992, which was the result of an evidentiary hearing 
held on January 7, 1992, where the Respondent requested, among 
other things, that the Appellant be held in contempt of the trial 
court's prior orders based on the Appellant's repeated non-
compliance with those orders. No appeal has been taken from the 
January 24, 1992, Findings, Conclusions and Order which made the 
original contempt finding. The January 24, 1992, Order stayed the 
imposition of sanctions, provided the Appellant pay certain sums 
towards his child support obligations. The Appellant failed to do 
so, requiring the Respondent to seek imposition of the previously 
imposed sanctions. That resulted in a May 18, 1992, hearing where 
the trial court determined that Appellant had not satisfied the 
earlier requirements to stay imposition of the sanctions. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, an Order was entered which reactivated 
the sanctions which had been stayed, but again gave Appellant the 
opportunity to avoid imposition of the sanctions previously 
ordered, if certain payments towards past due child support and 
alimony were made. It is from this June 19, 1992, Order that this 
appeal is taken. 
Appellant, in his Statement of the Case, claims that this is 
also "an appeal from the Order of Judge Wilkinson upon remand 
awarding attorneyfs fees to the plaintiff as to litigation in the 
Utah Supreme Court and the Federal District Court of Utah." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) That Order was signed and entered on 
December 3, 1992. No Notice of Appeal has been filed in connection 
with that Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Osguthorpe seeks the* following relief from this Court in 
connection with Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal: 
1) That the trial court's Findings, Conclusions and Orders 
related to Dr. Osguthorpe's contempt be affirmed in all respects. 
2) That Point VI of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief be disregarded in 
its entirety. 
3) That Mrs. Osguthorpe be awarded all of her attorney's 
fees and costs related to defending this Appeal. 
4) For such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate 
and fair under the circumstances of this case. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Osguthorpe's Statement of Facts contains allegations of 
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facts not pertinent to this appeal. These begin at page 15 of his 
Brief. Mrs. Osguthorpe objects to the inclusion of those 
allegations in his Statement of Facts and respectfully requests 
this Court to disregard the same. 
Mrs. Osguthorpe will supplement Appellant's Statement of Facts 
to the extent necessary so that this Court will have an accurate 
historical perspective about the parties and what has transpired 
since the parties were divorced in February of 1989. 
In addition, Mrs. Osguthorpe has included in the Addendum to 
this Brief, copies of the pleadings, Findings and Orders, and 
certain Exhibits received at the January 7, 1992, hearing and which 
serve as the basis for the trial courts finding of contempt and 
imposition of sanctions on Dr. Osguthorpe. 
The parties have four children as issue of this marriage, 
Jeffrey, age 15; John, age 14; and twins, Julie and Jennifer, age 
11. Under the original Decree, among other things, Dr. Osguthorpe 
was ordered to pay to Respondent, Mrs. Osguthorpe, the sum of 
$150.00 per month, per child, as and for child support for the 
parties1 four minor children, for a total of $600.00 per month, 
together with the sum of $150.00 per month alimony for a period of 
five years. At the end of five years, the alimony award was 
ordered to be reduced to the sum of $1.00 per year for an 
additional five year period, or until such time as Mrs. Osguthorpe 
remarried, cohabited or died, whichever of the four events was 
first to occur. (R-272.) 
On March 28, 1989, Dr. Osguthorpe filed an appeal of the trial 
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court's ruling on a number of issues, including alimony and child 
support. This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in all 
respects and awarded Mrs. Osguthorpe the attorney's fees she 
incurred on appeal. [Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah 
App. 1990), a copy of this opinion has been included in the 
Addendum to this Brief.] 
In its principal opinion, this Court deferred to the trial 
court's assessment of witness credibility in finding that, 
"Defendant was not being candid as to his actual current income, or 
was purposefully underemployed," and that, "Defendant was either 
understating his actual income or had chosen employment which paid 
less than he could otherwise* earn." Osguthorpe at 534. With 
regard to the child support, this Court also deferred to the trial 
court's assessment that, "Defendant had an ability to earn more 
than he purported to earn and find no abuse of discretion in the 
Court's award of child support in accordance with that assessment." 
Id. at 535. Since the Decree, Dr. Osguthorpe has not sought to 
modify any provision of the Decree. 
In September, 1991, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed Plaintiff's Verified 
Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions and Other Relief. 
(R-466.) That Motion came on regularly for hearing before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner on October 8, 1991. Defendant 
filed an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation. (R-488.) 
Mrs. Osguthorpe then noticed a hearing on Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiff's Written Order and Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Contempt Order, etc., filed January 11, 1991, and 
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Defendant's Objections to Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations 
related to Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgment, Contempt 
Order, Sanctions, and other relief made October 8, 1991. This 
Motion came on regularly for full evidentiary hearing on January 7, 
1992, before Judge Wilkinson. Both sides were present, testified, 
called witnesses and introduced documentary evidence. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order and 
Judgment from the January 7, 1992, hearing were signed and entered 
on January 24, 1992, and have been included in the Addendum to this 
Brief. The trial court found Dr. Osguthorpe in contempt and 
ordered him to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail, but 
stayed the jail sentence if, by January 13, 1992, Dr. Osguthorpe 
paid $5,000.00 towards the child support arrearages already reduced 
to judgment. The jail sentence was further stayed, provided Dr. 
Osguthorpe pay to Mrs. Osguthorpe, in a timely fashion, the sum of 
$900.00 per month ($600.00 regular child support and $3 00.00 
towards child support arrearages). If Dr. Osguthorpe did not make 
these monthly payments, as ordered, then the stay of the jail 
sentence was to be lifted and Dr. Osguthorpe was ordered to 
immediately commence serving that sentence. The order allowed Dr. 
Osguthorpe to purge himself of this contempt by paying the amounts 
he was ordered to pay. Dr. Osguthorpe paid the $5,000.00, as 
ordered by the Court, on January 13, 1992. However, he did not 
make his regular child support payments and payments on the 
arrearages as required. (R-589, 590.) 
On April 30, 1992, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed a Verified Motion 
7 
for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail 
Sentence, a copy of which has been included in the Addendum to this 
Brief. It, together with a Notice of Hearing, was properly served 
on Dr. Osguthorpe by mailing to his home and business addresses. 
That Motion, among other things, requested that the stay of 
sanctions imposed by the January 24, 1992, Order of Contempt be 
lifted and that an additional judgment for child support and 
alimony not paid by Dr. Osguthorpe between January cind May, 1992, 
be entered against him. (R-588.) The Motion was heard by the 
Court on May 18, 1992. Both parties were present. Documentary 
evidence was presented by Dr. Osguthorpe and received by the Court. 
During the course of that hearing, the trial court stated: 
That this matter has already been up before 
the Court of Appeals on one occasion, that the 
Court sustained this Court, and that the Court 
indicated the same as this Court has, that 
Defendant's income as stated by him is just 
not realistic. The Court of Appeals took the 
position that the unknown amounts of income, 
that there was an unknown amount of income 
that this Court has taken into consideration 
and it was justified in doing so, and no 
matter how you look at it, we still have 
children there that do need to be supported. 
(Transcript May 18, 1992, hearing Vol. 2 p. 
2.) 
A final Order emanating from that hearing was signed and 
entered on June 19, 1992. A copy has been included in the Addendum 
to this Brief. Pursuant to the terms of this Order, Dr. Osguthorpe 
was ordered to be incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail for a 
period of thirty days and such longer time as the Court deemed fit, 
if Dr. Osguthorpe failed to pay the sum of $3,050.00 by June 24, 
1992, at 12:00 noon. He has failed to make the required payments. 
On or about June 24, 1992, Dr. Osguthorpe filed a Motion for 
Stay of Jail Sentence in the Utah Court of Appeals. On that same 
day, Judge Russell W. Bench granted a temporary stay, until the 
matter could be heard on its merits. 
On July 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued its Order 
denying the stay and wrote in part as follows: 
It is hereby ordered that the motion for stay 
pending appeal is denied, and the temporary 
stay previously granted is vacated, based upon 
the court's determination that appellant has 
not sufficiently demonstrated that he would be 
likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal. 
See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 
(Utah App. 1987) (per curiam), and 
It is further ordered that the case is 
temporarily remanded to the trial court for 
determination and entry of an award of 
appellee's costs and attorney's fees 
reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for 
stay. (Emphasis Added.) 
As of the January 7, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe owed Mrs. 
Osguthorpe over $32,000.00 in unpaid child support, alimony and 
attorney's fees. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5, Addendum to this 
Brief.) As of the May 18, 1992, he had failed to pay $2,550.00 in 
child support and alimony, which had accrued between the January 
and May hearings. (R-615.) 
During the January 7th hearing, he testified that he was a 
doctor of veterinarian medicine, practicing for 15 years, and 
earned only $5.00 per hour. (Transcript, January 7, 1992, hearing 
Vol. II p. 69.) He acknowledged he understood all of his 
obligations under the original Decree and had not complied with 
them. Id. pp. 56-61. He said he hadn't paid child support 
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because he hadn't had certain items of personal property returned 
to him. Id. p. 35. Later, during the hearing, he denied making 
that statement. Id. p. 64. He couldn't recall if he paid child 
support in November and December 1991, and January 1992. Id. p. 
62. He couldn't identify a picture of the new $155,000.00 home his 
new wife had just purchased in which they were living. (Id. p. 69 
and Exhibit 14 Addendum.) He said he was paying her $500.00 per 
month to live there. Id. p.76. 
During the hearing, a tape recording of a conversation he had 
had with Mrs. Osguthorpe was listened to and the tape and a 
transcript of that conversation was received in evidence. After it 
was presented to the trial court, Dr. Osguthorpe denied that he had 
said, 
God, I thought you were going to have my ass 
in jail.(Laughter) Id. p. 74. 
(A copy of the transcript is included in the Addendum to this Brief 
and the original tape recording is in the Exhibit Envelope for the 
January 7, 1992, hearing.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
All claims, allegations and arguments contained in Dr. 
Osguthorpe's Brief which pertain to anything occurring after June 
19, 1992, should be disregarded entirely, these matters not being 
properly before this Court in connection with this Appeal. 
POINT II 
The Appellant's claim of error in relation to the contempt 
issue is without merit. First, the January 1992, Findings and 
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Order giving rise to the contempt citation have never been 
appealed. This appeal pertains only to the June 1992, Order 
imposing the jail sentence after the Appellant had failed to purge 
himself of his earlier contempt. Assuming only for the sake of 
argument, that Appellant could challenge the January Order in this 
appeal, the evidence presented at the January hearing fully 
supports the trial court's written findings and satisfies all of 
the legal requirements for a finding of contempt. Further, the 
Appellant was afforded the procedural due process requirements 
required by the United States and Utah Constitutions as have been 
outlined and set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. 
POINT III 
The Order granting Mrs. Osguthorpe her attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in connection with Dr. Osguthorpe's Petition's for 
Extraordinary Writ and Writ of Habeas Corpus has not been appealed, 
and therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the same. 
POINT IV 
The points raised by Dr. Osguthorpe on appeal are without 
merit. In addition, his actions throughout the course of this 
litigation reveal motives and attitudes which should not be 
tolerated by the judicial system. Mrs. Osguthorpe should be 
awarded the attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in 




THE PORTIONS OF DR. OSGUTHORPE'S BRIEF WHICH 
RELATED TO EVENTS AND CLAIMS THAT OCCURRED 
AFTER JUNE 24, 1992, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
BY THIS COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. 
Dr. Osguthorpe filed his Notice of Appeal in this case on June 
24, 1992. (R-632.) (See Addendum.) The Appeal was taken from an 
Order entered by the lower court on June 19, 1992. A substantial 
portion of Dr. Osguthorpe's brief contains allegations and argument 
related to events, hecirings and orders which occurred after the 
June 19, 1992, Order. No appeal has been taken from any subsequent 
Orders. Pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. those claims and matters are not properly 
before this Court and Mrs. Osguthorpe respectfully requests this 
Court to disregard all such allegations and argument in their 
entirety. (See, Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), Burgers 
v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).) In addition, no Notice of 
Appeal has been filed in relation to the trial court's January 24, 
1992, Order and, therefore, any claim of error assigned to this 
Order should also be disregarded. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING DR. 
OSGUTHORPE IN CONTEMPT OF IT'S PREVIOUS ORDERS 
AND IN IMPOSING SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
IN ALL RESPECTS. 
In arguing that the trial court committed reversible error in 
finding Dr. Osguthorpe in contempt and in imposing sanctions, 
Appellant has not clearly explained the nature and outcome of the 
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January 7, 1992, and May 18, 1992, hearings. Dr. Osguthorpe has 
claimed error in findings and orders not appealed from and has 
based much of his argument on a period of time which occurred after 
his Notice of Appeal of the June 19, 1992, Order was filed. Before 
his claims of error regarding the contempt issues can be addressed, 
the chronology and interrelationship of the January and May 
hearings must be understood. 
In January, a full evidentiary hearing was held on the issue 
of Dr. Osguthorpefs contemptuous behavior. Proper notice of the 
hearing was given. (R-543, 544.) Mrs. Osguthorpe1s Motion seeking 
a contempt citation, among other things, was verified and set forth 
that she was seeking imposition of a jail sentence based upon Dr. 
Osguthorpe's repeated violations of prior court orders. Fourteen 
months before, after his trial counsel had withdrawn, Dr. 
Osguthorpe had been given proper notice to retain new counsel or 
appear in person. (R-381.) Since that time, and until June 11, 
1992, Dr. Osguthorpe appeared pro se at all hearings, filed 
pleadings, objections and other papers with the court on his own 
behalf. 
At the January hearing both parties appeared. Consistent with 
his practice over the prior 14 months, Dr. Osguthorpe represented 
himself. At this hearing he testified, introduced documentary 
evidence, called his own witnesses and cross-examined Mrs. 
Osguthorpe and her counsel. Furthermore, he made opening and 
closing statements. (Transcript January 7, 1992, hearing, Vol. 
II.) 
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Also at this hearing, evidence was presented as to Dr. 
Osguthorpe's ability to earn income and his knowledge and 
understanding of his obligations to pay support under the original 
Decree. Id. pp. 56-62. This hearing lasted almost a full day and 
at it's conclusion, the trial court made its Findings and 
Conclusions and an Order, all of which were reduced to writing and 
not signed until Dr. Osguthorpe had had the proper time to file 
objections. 
The Findings and Conclusions, ultimately signed and entered on 
January 24, 1992, in pertinent part state: 
5. UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
a. Defendant has failed to pay child 
support and alimony for considerable periods 
of time (See plaintiff's Exhibits 2, 3,4 and 
5). Between December 1990 and January 1992, 
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child 
support, $2,100 in cilimony (total $10,500 plus 
accrued interest). Defendant paid $750 
leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for 
January, 1992.) No chid support has been paid 
since February, 1991. 
b. Defendant and his current wife both 
testified 'He would pay child support if his 
personal items were returned.' 
c. Defendant further testified the 
plaintiff had plenty of money and could sell 
one of her houses. 
d. Defendant has not demonstrated good 
faith in connection with attempting to pay his 
ongoing support obligations. 
e. Defendant testified he was paying 
his new wife $500 per month rent in order to 
reside with her in a home she recently 
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
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f. Defendant is a veterinarian 
practicing in excess of 15 years and testified 
he earned $5,00 per hour in connection with 
consultation he claimed he provided to the 
Osguthorpe Animal Hospital. Defendant had and 
has the means to pay child support. 
g. The credibility of the defendant and 
his present wife is lacking. Both refused to 
answer questions on the stand. Both were 
evas ive. The defendant did not answer 
questions truthfully. 
h. The defendant's failure to pay his 
support obligations as previously ordered was 
done willfully, voluntarily and with the full 
knowledge of those obligations as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
6. CONTEMPT. The Court finds the defendant 
is in contempt of this Court pursuant to 
Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended) , in that he has been disobedient 
of lawful judgments, orders and processes of 
this Court. The defendant had the opportunity 
to have a full hearing and evidence has been 
taken regarding that contempt. The defendant 
has not answered the questions put to him 
truthfully. The Court specifically finds that 
this is one of the most flagrant violations of 
the law as far as support of children that has 
come before this Court, in that the Defendant 
owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid 
child support alone. Defendant is further in 
contempt for his failure to pay alimony and 
attorney's fees as previously ordered by the 
Court. (R-557-559.) (Emphasis added.) 
It was from these findings that the trial court entered its 
Order of January 24, 1992, sentencing the Defendant to jail, but 
also staying that jail sentence provided Dr. Osguthorpe pay certain 
sums towards the arrearages. (R-552.) The court also gave Dr. 
Osguthorpe the opportunity to purge himself of this contempt by 
paying the sums required. (R-553.) 
Dr. Osguthorpe never appealed the January 24th Findings, 
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Conclusion and Order. On that basis alone he is precluded from 
claiming any error in connection with that Order in this appeal. 
(See Rule 4(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
After the hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe not only failed to make the 
required monthly payments on the arrearage, but also again did not 
make his full regular child support and alimony payment. He paid 
only $1,500.00 on a $3,000.00 obligation between February and May 
of 1992. Because of his failure to make the payments on the 
arrearages as required by the January 24th Order, and his failure 
to make ongoing support payments, Mrs. Osguthorpe filed a new 
Motion seeking judgment on the new arrearages and imposition of the 
jail sentence which was imposed under the January 24th Order, but 
stayed, provided Dr. Osguthorpe made the required payments. 
(R-588-592, See Addendum.) 
Dr. Osguthorpe was again given proper notice of this hearing 
and he again testified, by way of proffer, and again introduced 
documentary evidence. (Transcript May 18, 1992, hearing, Vol. I.) 
During this hearing he admitted he had not paid the amounts 
required in order to stay the earlier imposed jail sentence, (Id. 
p. 6.) and admitted he had not paid all of his regular ongoing 
child support and alimony payments. (Id. p.7.) 
At the conclusion of this second hearing, the Court imposed 
the jail sentence which had been stayed in January and gave Dr. 
Osguthorpe yet another chance to avoid the jail sentence by 
including in its Order: 
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However the Court will stay its imposition of 
jail sentence, as long as the following 
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay 
this Order until June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, 
at which time $4,050.00 shall be paid by 
Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent 
child support and alimony through June 1992, 
($1,800.00 in child support through June 1992, 
and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992; 
and attorney's fees of $500.00 for purpose of 
these proceedings). If the $3,050.00 is not 
paid by June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, a bench 
warrant shall issue, unless the defendant 
submits himself to the Salt Lake County Jail 
for incarceration. (b) The Court further 
orders that if the on-going child support and 
payment on arrearages of $900.00 per month due 
on the 5th day of July, 1992, is not paid at 
that time, a bench warrant shall issue, unless 
Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the 
Salt Lake County Jail. (R-615.) 
And again Dr. Osguthorpe failed to comply. It was only after 
all of this did a Bench Warrant issue for Dr. Osguthorpefs arrest. 
Appellant's argument pertaining to the contempt issue can be 
distilled into two simple questions. 
1) Was there sufficient evidence and are the Findings 
sustainable in connection with the contempt citation 
which resulted from the January hearing? 
2) Was Dr. Osguthorpe afforded adequate procedural due 
process in connection with the finding of contempt made 
by the trial court in January 1992? 
The answer to the first question is "yes" in both respects. 
Throughout the history of this case, Dr. Osguthorpe, a doctor of 
veterinarian medicine practicing for over 15 years with his father 
Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe, at the Osguthorpe Veterinary Hospital, 
claimed he only made/makes $1,000.00 per month. At the initial 
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divorce trial, the trial court found otherwise concluding that Dr. 
Osguthorpe either understated his income or was underemployed. On 
appeal, this Court affirmed that finding. Osguthorpe v. 
Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) . A copy of this case has 
been included in the Addendum to this Brief. 
Since that time cind continuously through the present, Dr. 
Osguthorpe has maintained that same position. However, simply 
because Dr. Osguthorpe says that's the case doesn't mean that his 
claim is true. In fact, in all evidentiary hearings conducted in 
this case, the trial court has specifically found to the contrary. 
The January 7th hearing is no exception. After a full 
hearing, the trial court specifically found: 
1) That he said he would pay the child support 
ordered if certain personal property was awarded to him; 
2) That he had not acted in good faith in paying his 
ongoing child support obligations; 
3) That he had cind has the means to pay child 
support; 
4) That he did not answer questions truthfully; 
and 
5) That his failure to pay his support obligations 
was done willfully, voluntarily and with full knowledge 
of those obligations. (R-557-559; Addendum to this 
Brief.) 
This Court recently enumerated the elements necessary for a 
trial court to find a person in contempt in State v. Hurst. 821 
18 
P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1991), where Judge Greenwood stated: 
For the court to hold Hurst in contempt for 
failure to comply with a court order, it had 
to find that she (1) knew what was required, 
(2) had the ability to comply and (3) 
intentionally failed to do so. Von Hake v. 
Thomas 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). These 
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding, and 
by clear and convincing evidence in a civil 
contempt proceeding. Id. Hurst, at 471. 
Even assuming that this was a criminal contempt proceeding, 
that burden was met not only by the language of the Findings 
themselves, but also by the statements of Judge Wilkinson when he 
issued his order from the bench at the conclusion of the January 
hearing. 
He (Dr. Osguthorpe) just perjures himself in 
this courtroom . . . 
He has not answered the questions truthfully 
The Court finds that this is one of the most 
flagrant violations of the law as far as 
support of children that has come before this 
court. 
(Transcript January 7, 1992, hearing, Vol. Ill 
p. 9, 10; parenthetical language added.) 
Judge Greenwood, in affirming the trial court's finding of 
contempt in the Hurst case goes on to state: 
We affirm the trial court's findings and the 
conclusions logically flowing therefrom-if the 
findings are based on sufficient evidence, 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
generous to the trial court. West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1312-14 
(Utah App. 1991) . We will not set aside a 
finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a). We give 'due regard' to the 
'opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
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credibility of the witnesses. ' Id. To show 
insufficiency of the evidence, Hurst is 
required to 'marshal all the evidence 
supporting the challenged findings and then 
show that despite that evidence, the findings 
are clearly lacking in support.' (State of 
Utah, in the Interest of M.S., 815 P.2d 1325, 
1328 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather than marshaling the evidence supporting 
the challenged findings, Hurst has restated 
only the evidence favorable to her position. 
Because she failed to marshal the evidence, we 
accept the challenged finding and the 
resulting conclusions. See Majestic Inv., at 
1312-14; Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P. 2d 939, 
44 (Utah App. 1990). Id. at 471. 
In the present case, Dr. Osguthorpe has failed to marshall all 
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that that evidence was insufficient. Like Ms. Hurst, 
he has attempted only to restate evidence which he thinks is 
favorable to his position. His challenge of the adequacy of the 
findings must fail. 
Dr. Osguthorpe goes on to argue that the contempt citation in 
his case was criminal in nature, however a review of both the 
January 24th and June 19th Orders shows that this is not the case 
when applying the criteria for civil contempt as established by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P. 2d 1162 (Utah 1988) . 
Justice Zimmerman thoroughly and comprehensively analyzes the 
contempt remedy in Utah and states: 
A contempt order is civil if it has a remedial 
purpose, either to coerce an individual to 
comply with a court order given for the 
benefit of another party or to compensate an 
aggrieved party for injuries resulting from 
the failure to comply with an order. See, 
e.g., Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 530 
(Utah 1981); Shillitani v. United States, 384 
20 
U.S. 364, 368-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1534-36, 16 
L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); cf. In re Whitmore. 9 Utah 
441, 35 P. 524, 526-29 (1894) (discussing the 
differences between criminal and civil 
contempt). It is important to note that it is 
the purpose, not the method of the punishment, 
that serves to distinguish the two types of 
proceedings. Both fines and imprisonment may 
be used to coerce a party or remedy a failure 
to perform as well as to vindicate a court's 
authority. See Bradshaw, 627 P.2d at 53 0; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-32-10 to -12 (1987). One 
distinguishing factor is whether the fine or 
sentence is conditional. A remedial purpose 
is indicated when the contemner is allowed to 
purge him-or herself of the contempt by 
complying with the court's orders. Maggio v. 
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68, 68 S.Ct. 401, 407, 92 
L.Ed. 476 (1948); see Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-
12 (1987) (allowing conditional imprisonment). 
Id. at 1168. (Emphasis added.) 
This distinction was also discussed and acknowledged by this 
Court in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991), when 
Judge Jackson analyzed the nature of a contempt citation that had 
been made against a husband in a divorce proceeding. 
Husband's imprisonment was unconditional. He 
was not permitted any opportunity to remedy or 
purge himself of the alleged contempt. Thus, 
the principal purpose of the judgment was to 
punish rather than obtain compliance with 
prior orders. Accordingly, the judgment was 
criminal in nature and appealable. Id. at 
1168; Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 
(Utah 1977.) Id. 
Both the January and June Orders were remedial in nature 
because they provided Dr. Osguthorpe with a way of avoiding the 
jail sentence and contempt citation by simply making the child 
support payments required by the Court. In fact, the January 24th 
Order, the only Order which should be analyzed in connection with 
the contempt issue, specifically states: 
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(g) Defendant may purge himself of his 
contempt as has been found by the Court by 
paying the amounts required in a Paragraph's 
(e) and (f) above. (R-553.) 
Clearly, the contempt citation before the court falls within 
the civil contempt definition established in Von Hcike, and Boggs 
supra. Dr. Osguthorpe's argument that this is a criminal contempt 
citation is without merit. 
Secondly, the adequacy and propriety January 24, 1992, 
Findings and Order, are not sxibject to challenge because no appeal 
has ever been taken from the same. Based upon that fact alone, no 
consideration should be given to any of Dr. Osguthorpe's argument 
attempting to challenge the contempt finding. [See Boggs at 481 
and Utah R.App. p.3(a).] 
Turning now to the second question raised by Dr. Osguthorpe 
regarding the adequacy of procedural due process, that argument 
must likewise fail based upon the Utah Supreme Court decision of 
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) which was relied on 
and cited with approval in the Von Hake and Boggs cases supra. In 
Burgers, the Defendant violated a permanent injunction and 
consequently, the trial court found him in contempt based upon the 
evidence and his own admissions and sentenced him to- serve 3 0 days 
in jail. On appeal, the Defendant claimed, among other things, 
that he was imprisoned without due process of law. In addressing 
and ultimately rejecting that claim, the Court stated: 
The defendant claims that he was denied 
due process in the order to show cause hearing 
held June 30, 1991. Both this Court and the 
United States Supreme Court have held that an 
individual's constitutional rights must be 
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protected during a contempt of court action. 
Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not 
committed in the presence of the court, due 
process requires that the person charged be 
advised of the nature of the action against 
him, have assistance of counsel, if requested, 
have the right to confront witnesses, and have 
the right to offer testimony on his behalf. 
See, In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 
92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 
267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 
(1925); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 
P.2d 519 (1963); Robinson v. City Court of 
Oaden, supra. 
In the present case, the defendant was 
given notice of the contempt charge against 
him when he was served with a copy of the 
order to show cause. The defendant appeared 
as his own counsel and offered testimony on 
his behalf. From an examination of the trail 
court transcript, it is clear that the trial 
court never denied the defendant the 
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses or 
call witnesses on his own behalf. On the 
contrary, the defendant himself never 
requested to confront or call a witness. Id. 
at 1322. (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, Dr. Osguthorpe received proper notice of 
the hearing and the fact that Mrs. Osguthorpe was requesting 
imposition of a jail sentence. He appeared. Almost a full day of 
evidence was presented. He never requested counsel. He made 
opening and closing statements. He testified. He called his own 
witnesses. He submitted documentary evidence which was received. 
He cross-examined Mrs. Osguthorpe and her counsel. He submitted 
pleadings, objections and motions in connection with the hearing. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the guidelines provided in Burgers 
and Boggs, supra., Dr. Osguthorpe's claim that he was denied due 
process must likewise fail. 
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It is respectfully requested that this court affirm the trial 
court's decision in relation to the contempt issue in all respects. 
POINT III 
DR. OSGUTHORPE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN AWARDING MRS. OSGUTHORPE CERTAIN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATED TO THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION AND THE 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ACTION IS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED. 
In Point VI of Dr. Osguthorpe's Brief, he argues that the 
trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe the attorney's fees 
and costs she incurred in connection with the Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ filed by Dr. Osguthorpe in the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Dr. 
Osguthorpe in the United States District Court, both of which were 
determined to be without merit and denied. 
Dr. Osguthorpe's claim that the trial court erred in awarding 
Mrs. Osguthorpe certain attorney's fees should be summarily denied, 
since it is not properly before this Court in connection with this 
Appeal. Dr. Osguthorpe filed his Notice of Appeal in this matter 
on June 24, 1992. (R-632.) (See Addendum.) The trial court's 
Order awarding Mrs. Osguthorpe those fees was signed and entered by 
Judge Wilkinson on December 3, 1992. (See Addendum,,) No Notice of 
Appeal has been filed in connection with that Order. 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provide the following deadline in which to appeal a trial court's 
order: 
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RULE 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(1) Filing appeal from final orders and 
judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district# juvenile, or circuit court to the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal from all final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial 
court within the time allowed by Rule 4. 
Failure of an appellant to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is ground only for such action as the 
appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the 
award of attorney fees. 
RULE 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(1) Appeal from final judgment and 
order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 3 0 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from . . . 
The 3 0 day time period has passed and consequently this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider this claim of error. (See, Yost v. 
State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981), Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1982).) 
Additionally, what appears to be an attempt by Dr. Osguthorpe 
to argue an issue that clearly is not properly before this Court, 
should be considered in connection with Mrs. Osguthorpe's request 
for an award of her attorney's fees and costs incurred by her in 
relation to this appeal. (See POINT IV below.) 
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POINT IV 
MRS. OSGUTHORPE SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) is the 
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in divorce actions. 
It states that: 
The Court may order either party to pay to the 
clerk a sum of money . . . to enable such 
party to prosecute or defend the action. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's fees 
incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See [Dahlberg v. 
Dahlberg. 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930) Carter v. Carter, 584, 
P. 2d 904 (Utah 1978) and Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P. 2d 162 (Utah 
App. 1989).] 
In considering whether or not to award Mrs. Osguthorpe the 
attorney's fees and costs she has been required to incur in 
connection with this appeal, it becomes imperative for this Court 
to understand the history of this case as it relates to Dr. 
Osguthorpe's obstinate and contumacious behavior and lack of 
respect for the judicial process, the court's authority and the 
substantial financial and emotional hardship his attitude has 
created for Mrs. Osguthorpe. 
The following are but a few examples of Dr. Osguthorpe1 s 
behavior and attitude demonstrated since this case was originally 
filed. 
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1) The original Findings of the trial court in relation to 
Dr. Osguthorpe's income and ability to earn: 
The Defendant has chosen to be employed by his 
father at a salary which appears to be less 
than he could make in another independent 
employment situation, and it appears that the 
Defendant has the ability to earn more than he 
presently does. The Court further received 
conflicting testimony as to whether or not the 
tax returns of the parties accurately 
reflected the amount of monies available to 
meet the family's financial needs, and the 
Court finds that the tax returns appear to 
understate the actual net income that was 
available to the parties during the marriage 
for family and living expenses. (R-256.) 
Dr. Osguthorpe's testimony at the January 7, 1992, 
on contempt where he: 
a) Stated he'd pay child support when certain minor 
items of personal property were returned to him and later on 
in the proceedings denied he'd so testified. (January 7, 
1992, hearing, Transcript Vol. II p. 35, 64); 
b) Denied he had made statements reflecting a total 
lack of concern about his potential for being incarcerated for 
not paying child support. The actual tape recording and 
transcript of that conversation were received as evidence and 
listened to during the course of the hearing. (January 7, 
1992, Transcript p. 74, 111.) A copy of that transcript is 
included in the Addendum to this Brief; 
c) Would not identify the $155,000.00, 4,000+ square 
foot home he and his new wife were residing in, even when 
shown a picture of the same. (January 7, 1992, Transcript p. 




the Addendum to this Brief); 
d) In all stages of these proceedings, (pre-trial, 
trial, first appeal, numerous hearings after remand) 
attorney's fees have been assessed against Dr. Osguthorpe and 
he has paid nothing towards any such award. 
e) The Trial Court's statements made in connection with 
the January 7, 1992, contempt hearing: 
Counsel hit the nail on the head, that if 
you came into this court showing good faith, 
that would be something else. But not one 
dime has been paid; and yet he testified as to 
how, 'this is my wife's house, and I have to 
pay her $500 a month rent.' 
If I had three children, and I loved 
those children, I would be paying that child 
support long before I paid $500 to live in a 
house of that means. If I had an education, 
and I was a veterinarian, and I was only 
earning $5 an hour, I would certainly be 
looking to cinother type of work to earn a 
living for my family. I'm just not persuaded, 
just not persuaded. 
And the testimony of the Defendant, his 
credibility is lacking, both he and his wife; 
they refuse to ansv/er questions on the stand, 
very evasive instecid of just saying the truth 
as to what is taking place. 
And to when asked about paying any 
child support, how did he word it? It was, 
'not definite,' or something of that sort. He 
either knows or he doesn't know. He just 
perjures himself in this courtroom . . . The 
court would further find that the Defendant 
has had an opportunity to have a hearing here 
in the courtroom, that evidence has been taken 
regarding the contempt, that his credibility 
is in question, he has not answered the 
questions put to him truthfully 
(Transcript no. 3 January 7, 1992, hearing, 
PP- 8,9); 
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f) The trial court's Findings made in connection with 
the January 7, 1992, hearing on contempt; 
5. UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, 
a. Defendant has failed to pay child 
support and alimony for considerable periods 
of time (See plaintiff's Exhibits 2,3,4 and 
5). Between December 1990 and January 1992, 
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child 
support, $2,100 in alimony (total $10,500 plus 
accrued interest). Defendant paid $750 
leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for 
January, 1992.) No child support has been 
paid since February, 1991. 
b. Defendant and his current wife both 
testified 'He would pay child support if his 
personal items were returned.' 
c. Defendant further testified the 
plaintiff had plenty of money and could sell 
one of her houses. 
d. Defendant has not demonstrated good 
faith in connection with attempting to pay his 
ongoing support obligations. 
e. Defendant testified he was paying 
his new wife $500 per month rent in order to 
reside with her in a home she recently 
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
f. Defendant is a veterinarian 
practicing in excess of 15 years and testified 
he earned $5.00 per hour in connection with 
consultation he claimed he provided to the 
Osguthorpe Animal Hospital. Defendant had and 
has the means to pay child support. 
g. The credibility of the defendant and 
his present wife is lacking. Both refused to 
answer questions on the stand. Both were 
evasive. The defendant did not answer 
questions truthfully. 
h. The defendant's failure to pay his 
support obligations as previously ordered was 
done willfully, voluntarily and with the full 
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knowledge of those obligations as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
6. CONTEMPT, The Court finds the 
defendant is in contempt of this Court 
pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), in that he has 
been disobedient of lawful judgments, orders 
and processes of this Court. The defendant 
had the opportunity to have a full hearincj and 
evidence has been taken regarding that 
contempt. The defendant has not answered the 
questions put to him truthfully. The Court 
specifically finds that this is one of the 
most flagrant violations of the law as far as 
support of children that has come before this 
Court, in that the Defendant owes plaintiff in 
excess of $16,000 in unpaid child support 
alone. Defendant is further in contempt for 
his failure to pay alimony and attorney's fees 
as previously ordered by the Court. 
(R-557-559); 
g) As of the January 7, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe 
owed Mrs. Osguthorpe over $32,000 in unpaid child support, 
alimony and attorney's fees. (See Exhibits P-2, 3, 4, and 5 
included in the Addendum to this Brief); 
h) Between the January 7, 1992, hearing and the May 
18, 1992, hearing, Dr. Osguthorpe failed to pay an additional 
$2,550.00 in child support and alimony. (R-615.) 
The foregoing are but a few of the many examples of Dr. 
Osguthorpe's attitude towards "the system." 
Now Dr. Osguthorpe has filed a second appeal. Evidently, the 
cost of this appeal is being born by Dr. Osguthorpe's father (page 
14 of Appellant's Brief). Also, it appears that Dr. Osguthorpe 
wants this to be a "test case" (Appellant's Brief p. 15) . The Brief 
raises points and argues issues outside the scope of the appeal 
(Appellant's Brief Point VI). 
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When viewed cumulatively, no conclusion can be drawn other 
than that Dr. Osguthorpe wants to wear Mrs. Osguthorpe down. This 
Court should not let that occur. Mrs. Osguthorpe is regularly 
reminded of the trial testimony of Mr. Lynn Turnbow, a neighbor of 
the parties, about a conversation he had with Dr. Osguthorpe while 
this action was pending: 
MR. TURNBOW: 
A. Well, what I remember, he says that 
she really hasn't got a pot to piss in. And 
he says, my parents have a lot of money. And 
he says, I have a checking account. And my 
family can go out and hire the best lawyers. 
And he says that she is going to end up with 
nothing. And he says, the amount of money 
that I show I make is just not enough that 
she's even going to be able to survive with 
four kids, and she's going to be out on the 
street with nothing. She's going to starve. 
MR. KASTING: 
Q. Is there anything else that you can 
recall about that conversation as it pertains 
to this divorce action that Mr. Osguthorpe 
said to you? 
MR. TURNBOW: 
A. He just told me that she would be 
out on the streets with nothing. And he said, 
she's going to have one hell of a time raising 
four kids. Because he said, we have the money 
that we can drag this on. We can fight it 
forever. He said, her parents have no money 
to help her. And he said that the only way 
she can hire a lawyer is to go take a second 
mortgage on a second house that they have, I 
guess. (R-318-320.) 
When a party to a divorce action acts or fails to act in such 
a way as to cause the other party to incur unnecessary attorney's 
fees, it is most appropriate for the Court to require the 
recalcitrant party to reimburse the other those fees. [(See Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988).] 
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This Brief has demonstrated that the points raised by Dr. 
Osguthorpe on this appeal are without merit. In addition, his 
actions throughout the course of this litigation reveal motives and 
attitudes which should never be tolerated by the judicial system. 
It is respectfully requested that Mrs. Osguthorpe be awarded 
all of her attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal which has now been taken by Dr. Osguthorpe is 
wholly lacking in merit. Utah law is clear on the trial court's 
powers and duties in relation to contempt proceedings. Dr. 
Osguthorpe's appeal is fatally flawed in that 1) the claims of 
error he argues arise from Findings and Orders on which no appeal 
has been taken and 2) even assuming that such failure to properly 
appeal is not fatal, the trial court cited correctly and in accord 
with Utah law in the manner it dealt with the contempt proceeding. 
Given the history of this case, Dr. Osguthorpe's questionable 
credibility and the lack of merit of this appeal, Mrs. Osguthorpe 
should be awarded all of her attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
having to respond to this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2~ day of ^eJb^oaXu7 1993. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
KENT M. KASTING 
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Defendant's residence A 
19. Utah Statutes Cited A 
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by rendering advisory services. Neither 
the performance of these functions nor this 
Court's approval of the budget transforms 
the Bar into a "public agency."2 
In addition, the Utah State BaT Associa-
tion has a number of attributes of nongov-
ernmental organizations. It is a private 
organization. It has the capacity to sue 
and be sued. It owns real property in its 
own name, and the State has no interest 
therein.3 See Rules for Integration and 
Management of the Utah State Bar, Rule 
(A)l. The Bar pays taxes on its real and 
personal property. Although it is subject 
to the supervision of the Utah Supreme 
Court, it is in large part self-governed by 
Bar commissioners who are elected by Bar 
members. Employees are not paid by the 
state and are not entitled to any benefits 
given state employees. The Bar is funded 
completely by the dues and fees paid by its 
members and Bar applicants; it receives no 
public funds or tax revenues. It exists 
independently of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of state government. When 
it is sued, it hires its own counsel. It is not 
treated as a state agency by the Attorney 
General, the State Auditor, or the Treasur-
er, nor is it under the control or supervision 
of the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
Although its budget has recently been ap-
proved by this Court, it is not subject to the 
approval of the Legislature. 
Further, the Bar conducts a number of 
activities not related to its regulatory func-
tions in the admission and discipline of at-
torneys. The Bar provides a number of 
public services, such as numerous profes-
sional educational courses and seminars, a 
lawyer referral program, and public edu-
cation programs. It staffs small claims 
courts, publishes a newsletter containing 
educational and disciplinary information, 
and collects funds through a voluntary pro-
gram which are used to reimburse clients 
for financial losses caused by the unethical 
conduct of lawyers. The Bar has acquired, 
operates, and maintains the Law and Jus-
2. It was of no consequence in Keller that the 
California Legislature approved the budget of 
the California State Bar. See Keller v. State Bar 
of California, 495 US. , 110 S.CL 2228, 110 
LEd^d 1 (1990). 
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tice Center. The acquisition was accom-
plished entirely without governmental 
funds. 
The Utah Constitution assigns to this 
Court the power to "govern the practice of 
law." Article VIII, § 4. We need not, and 
therefore do not, decide whether that grant 
ousts the Legislature from all control over 
the Bar or whether the Records Act and 
Writings Act would be unconstitutional if 
applied to the Bar. We decide only that, as 
written, those acts do not apply to the Bar 
because it is not a "state agency" or "pub-
lic office" within the meaning of those acts. 
Because the judgment of the trial court 
must be reversed, it follows that the plain-
tiff is not entitled to attorney fees or exem-
plar}' damages. 
Reversed in part; affirmed in part. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
Jeanette OSGUTHORPE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jerry OSGUTHORPE, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 890219-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 19, 1990. 
On Rehearing May 10, 1990. 
Husband in divorce action appealed 
from factual findings, legal conclusions and 
3. The Bar's present facility was financed by 
contributions and fees paid by Bar members, by 
contributions from the public and charitable 
trusts, and by a mortgage loan from a bank. 
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divorce decree entered in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) 
trial court, in determining alimony award, 
was not required to make specific finding 
regarding husband's income, but could de-
termine that husband was either earning 
more than evidence indicated or had ability 
to earn more money; (2) evidence sup-
ported trial court's determination that cash 
gift from husband's father was intended 
for both parties and, thus, court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to award 
such cash to husband; (3) trial court was 
not required to award husband interest on 
husband's equitable lien against parties' 
property as lien had not yet been reduced 
to judgment; and (4) evidence of reason-
ableness and need was sufficient to support 
award of attorney fees to wife. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <s=>237 
In determining alimony, trial court 
must consider financial conditions and 
needs of receiving spouse, ability of receiv-
ing spouse to produce sufficient income for 
him or herself, and ability of responding 
spouse to provide support. 
2. Divorce <s»239 
Trial court, in determining alimony 
award, was not required to make specific 
finding regarding husband's income, but 
could determine that husband was either 
earning more than evidence indicated or 
had ability to earn more money; trial court 
stated that husband, a veterinarian claim-
ing monthly income of $1,192.80, had cho-
sen to be employed by his father at lower 
salary than he could have earned. 
3. Divorce e=>307 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to make specific finding regard-
ing husband's income in awarding wife 
monthly child support of $150 per child; 
trial court determined that husband was 
either understating his actual income or 
had chosen employment which paid less 
than he could otherwise earn. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-5. 
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4. Divorce <^252.1, 286(5) 
In determining division of property in 
divorce action, trial court has wide discre-
tion in adjusting financial and property in-
terests and its actions are entitled to pre-
sumption of validity. 
5. Divorce <3=>252.3(3) 
In making equitable property division 
in divorce action, trial courts should gener-
ally award property acquired by one spouse 
by gift and inheritance during marriage to 
that spouse, together with any appreciating 
or enhancement of its value, unless other 
spouse has contributed to enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that proper-
ty, thereby acquiring equitable interest in 
it, or property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling or ex-
changes or where acquiring spouse has 
made gift of interest in property to other 
spouse. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
6. Divorce <s=*253(2) 
Evidence supported trial court's deter-
mination in divorce action that cash gift 
from husband's father was intended for 
both parties and, thus, court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to award such 
cash to husband; while husband's father 
testified that gifts were given solely for 
husband, wife testified that she had always 
believed gifts were for both parties and, 
with exception of gift made at about time 
of parties' separation, gifts were made in 
form of checks payable jointly to both par-
ties. 
7. Interest <s»52 
Trial court in divorce proceeding can-
not stay statutory accrual of interest on 
judgment for unpaid child support U.C.A. 
1953, 15-1-4. 
8. Liens «=»7 
"Equitable lien," unlike "judgment" 
required to bear interest at statutory rate, 
only gives lienholder right to collect debt 
out of chairged property, whereas "judg-
ment" is final consideration and determina-
tion of court on matters submitted to it in 
action or proceeding. U.C.A.1953, 15-1-4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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9. Interest «=>21 
Trial court in divorce proceeding was 
not required to award husband interest on 
husband's equitable lien against parties' 
property as lien had not yet been reduced 
to judgment: court stated that lien amount 
should be paid to husband when wife re-
married, cohabited, sold home, moved from 
home, or when youngest child reached age 
of majority, whichever occurred first. U.C. 
A.1953, 15-1-4. 
10. Divorce e=>227(l) 
To recover attorney fees in divorce 
proceeding, movant must demonstrate that 
award is "reasonable" and that need of 
requesting party compels award; factors 
for determining reasonableness include ne-
cessity for number of hours utilized, rea-
sonableness of rate charged in light of 
difficulty of case and result accomplished, 
and rates commonly charged for similar 
services in community. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Divorce <>226 
Evidence of reasonableness and need 
was sufficient to support award of attorney 
fees to wife in divorce action; wife's attor-
ney stated that his hourly rate of $100 per 
hour was reasonable and court found that 
wife did not have ability to pay fees and 
that husband did have ability to pay portion 
of wife's fees and costs. 
On Petition for Rehearing 
12. Divorce e=>224 
Before court will award attorney fees, 
trial court must find requesting part}* is in 
need of financial assistance and that fees 
requested are reasonable. U.CA. 1953, 30-
3-3. 
13. Divorce ^226 
Evidence supported trial court's find-
ings that wife in divorce action did not have 
ability to pay attorney fees incurred at trial 
and that husband should pay portion of 
wife's attorney fees, warranting award to 
wife of her costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred on husband's appeal. U.CA. 
1953, 30-3-3. 
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David S. Dolowitz, M. Joy Douglas, 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant. 
Kent M. Kasting, Dart, Adamson & 
Kasting, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 




Defendant, Jerry Osguthorpe, appeals 
from the trial court's findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and divorce decree. On 
appeal, he claims the trial court's findings 
of fact regarding alimony and child support 
are unsupported by the evidence and the 
trial court erred in allocating the parties' 
resources, failing to award him the gifts 
his father gave to him during the marriage, 
and requiring him to pay plaintiffs attor-
ney fees. We affirm. 
The parties were married in 1974 and 
separated in 1988. Four children, who at 
the time of the divorce ranged in age from 
eight to twelve, were born as issue of the 
marriage. Prior to the marriage, both par-
ties essentially completed their undergrad-
uate degrees. In 1974, defendant began 
veterinarian school, and his father paid for 
tuition and books. While defendant was in 
school, plaintiff worked as a waitress and 
cashier. In 1977, defendant received his 
degree and began working in his father's 
veterinary clinic. At trial, defendant testi-
fied that he was a consultant for his father 
and received $2,000 per month. Additional-
ly, defendant stated that he receives $350 
per month rental income. After taxes and 
business expenses, defendant testified that 
his net income was $1,192 per month and 
his monthly living expenses were $2,049.60. 
Plaintiff testified that she had a college 
education with an outdated teaching certifi-
cate. She worked as a cashier and wait-
ress while defendant was in veterinarian 
school and was a housewife and mother 
from 1977 until the parties' separation. At 
the time of trial, she was employed as an 
OSGUTHORPE 
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insurance claims processor, earning a net 
wage of $770 per month. She testified that 
she earned $160 from rental property and 
her monthly living expenses were $2,027. 
During the marriage, defendant's father 
provided the parties with $18,500 for a 
downpayment on their home on Chris Lane. 
He also gave them various cash gifts, in-
cluding a $10,000 Christmas gift in both 
1982 and 1983, a $5,000 Christmas gift in 
1985, and a $1,000 Christmas gift in both 
1986 and 1987. 
The court found that defendant's testi-
mony indicated a net monthly income of 
$1,192.80, including $350 per month from 
rental property. However, based on a re-
view of all the documents, the court found 
that defendant understated his income or 
was underemployed. The court also found 
plaintiff had a net rental income of $160, 
and a net monthly salary of $770 due to her 
employment as an insurance claims pro-
cessor. Plaintiffs monthly expenses, the 
court found, were $2,027. The court noted 
that it had received conflicting testimony 
regarding whether the parties' tax returns 
accurately reflected the amount of money 
available to meet the family's needs and 
found that the tax returns understated the 
actual net income available to the parties 
during the marriage for family and living 
expenses. The court also found that plain-
tiff assisted defendant in completing his 
education by working, caring for the home 
and raising the children. Based on those 
facts, the court ordered defendant to pay 
plaintiff $150 alimony per month for a peri-
od of five years, and $1 per year for an 
additional five year period, or until such 
time as plaintiff remarries, cohabits or dies, 
whichever occurs first. In addition, the 
court ordered defendant to pay child sup-
port of $150 per month per child. 
With regard to the parties' property, the 
court awarded plaintiff the home on Hill-
rise Circle which plaintiff purchased prior 
to the marriage. In addition, plaintiff was 
awarded exclusive use and occupancy of 
the parties' home on Chris Lane, subject to 
defendant's non-interest bearing equitable 
lien in the amount of $22,500. The court 
further found that defendant's father's 
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cash gifts, including the $18,500 downpay-
ment on the Chris Lane home were intend-
ed by defendant's father as a gift to both 
parties for their mutual use and benefit 
during the marriage. Lastly, the court or-
dered defendant to pay $3,939.65 of plain-
tiffs attorney fees. 
I. ALIMONY 
Defendant claims the trial court's alimo-
ny award is based on erroneous findings of 
fact regarding defendant's income. Defen-
dant assents the trial court erred in failing 
to enter a specific finding regarding defen-
dant's income and in finding defendant was 
undercompensated or underemployed. De-
fendant contends that instead of entering 
an alimony award based on speculation, the 
court should have made a finding and en-
tered an alimony award based on the evi-
dence. He also claims his alimony and 
child support award leave him with $442 
per month, an insufficient amount on which 
to support himself. 
[1] Trial courts have broad discretion in 
awarding alimony. Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). We will not 
disturb the trial court's alimony award so 
long as the trial court exercises its discre-
tion within the standards set by the court. 
Id In determining alimony, the trial court 
must consider three factors: 1) the finan-
cial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
him or herself; and 3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support 
Schindler v. Sckindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 
(Utah CtApp.1989). If the trial court con-
siders these factors, this court will not 
disturb tine alimony award unless such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. Id 
[2] With regard to plaintiffs financial 
conditions and needs, the court found that 
plaintiff had a net monthly income of $770, 
received $160 per month from rental prop-
erty, and had $2027 in monthly expenses. 
The count also reviewed plaintiffs ability to 
produce a sufficient income for herself in 
stating that plaintiff assisted defendant in 
A-+ 
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completing veterinarian school by working 
and caring for the house and children. The 
court also found that plaintiff has a college 
education with a teaching certificate but 
that her certificate was not presently re-
newed. At the time of trial, although 
plaintiff was employed, her employment 
would soon end. However, the court found 
that she is capable of finding good, gainful 
substitute employment 
Regarding defendant's ability to provide 
support, the trial court found that defen-
dant testified he received $2,000 per month 
from his employment as a veterinarian and 
an additional S350 per month from barn 
rental. After taxes and business expenses, 
defendant claimed to have a net monthly 
income of SI.192.80 and monthly expenses 
of $2049.60. The court reviewed the testi-
mony and the tax returns of the parties 
and found that defendant receives more 
monthly income than that reflected on his 
exhibit. Further, the court found that de-
fendant is employed by his father and was 
either overpaid when he began his employ-
ment or underpaid at present. In deter-
mining the amount of alimony to award, 
the court stated that defendant has the 
ability to earn more than his present in-
come and has chosen to be employed by his 
father at a lower salary. Also, the court 
stated that the tax returns, which indicated 
a yearly adjusted gross income of between 
$15,000 and $21,000 from 1982 to 1987, 
appear to understate the parties' income 
during the marriage. Based on these 
facts, the court awarded plaintiff $150 
monthly alimony for five years. After five 
years the court reduced alimony to $1 per 
year for five years, untfl plaintiff remar-
ries, cohabits or dies, whichever occurs 
first 
We find no error in the trial court's fail-
ure to make a specific finding regarding 
defendant's income in this circumstance. 
The trial court found that defendant was 
not being candid as to his actual current 
income or was purposefully underem-
ployed. We defer to the trial court's as-
sessment of the credibility of the witness-
es. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465,467 (Ct.App.1989). Given the 
evidence in the record, it was well within 
A-
the court's discretion to determine that de-
fendant was either earning more than the 
evidence indicated or had the ability to earn 
more money. We therefore will not dis-
turb the trial court's alimony award. 
II. CHILD SUPPORT 
[3] Similarly, defendant argues the trial 
court erred in awarding plaintiff monthly 
child support of $150 per child without en-
tering a specific finding regarding defen-
dant's income. Defendant claims the trial 
court failed to consider all of the factors 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 
(Supp.1989) in accordance with Jefferies v. 
Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989), 
the trial court has broad equitable power to 
order child support, taking into account the 
needs of the children and the ability of the 
parent to pay. Woodward v. Woodward, 
709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). The trial 
court's finding of fact will not be over-
turned unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. "Failure of the 
trial court to make findings on all material 
issues is reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment'" Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 
236 (Utah 1983)). Further, section 78-45-7 
enumerates the following material factors 
that the court must consider in setting pro-
spective support: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in 
failing to make specific findings on all of 
the factors. However, the court made find-
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ings regarding the relative wealth and in-
come of the parties, their respective abili-
ties to earn, and the children's mother's 
monthly expenses to provide for the chil-
dren's needs. Further, the evidence in the 
record indicates that defendant was thirty-
seven at the time of trial, while plaintiff 
was thirty-five. Defendant again claims 
the court erred in failing to enter a specific 
finding regarding defendant's income. 
Without such a finding, defendant claims, 
the court cannot determine an appropriate 
level of child support. We disagree. The 
trial court considered the evidence and as-
sessed the credibility of defendant's testi-
mony. Given the evidence, the court deter-
mined that defendant was either under-
stating his actual income or had chosen 
employment which paid less than he could 
otherwise earn. We defer to the trial 
court's assessment that defendant had an 
ability to earn more than he purported to 
earn and find no abuse of discretion in the 
court's award of child support in accord-
ance with that assessment. 
III. GIFTS 
Defendant also contends the trial court 
erred in failing to award him gifts his 
father gave to him during the marriage 
while returning to plaintiff her premarital 
property. Defendant claims entitlement to 
various cash gifts and an $18,500 loan his 
father made available to the parties for a 
downpayment on the Chris Lane home. 
Because defendant's father testified that 
the gifts were intended for his son and not 
the parties jointly, defendant claims the 
court should have awarded him those gifts. 
[4] There is no fixed formula for deter-
mining a division of property in a divorce 
action. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The trial 
court has wide discretion in adjusting fi-
nancial and property interests, and its ac-
tions are entitled to a presumption of validi-
ty. Id. Absent a showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not 
interfere with a property award. Throck-
morton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 
123 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
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[5] Section 30-3-5 (1989), provides: 
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and par-
ties." In making an "equitable" division, 
trial courts should generally award proper-
ty acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage to that 
spouse together with any appreciating or 
enhancement of its value unless: 1) the 
other spouse has contributed to the en-
hancement, maintenance, or protection of 
that property, thereby acquiring an eq-
uitable interest in it, or 2) the property has 
been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse had made a gift of an 
interest in the property to the other spouse. 
Mortensen v. Mortensent 760 P.2d 304, 308 
(Utah 1988). However, in making eq-
uitable orders pursuant to section 30-3-5, 
the court has consistently concluded that 
the trial court is given broad discretion in 
dividing property, regardless of its source 
or time of acquisition. Burke v. Burke, 
733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
[6] Defendant claims that because the 
gifts were intended for him, the trial court 
erred in failing to award him those gifts in 
accordance with Mortensen. However, the 
trial court found the gifts were intended 
for both parties and we will not overturn 
the court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
The record indicates that although defen-
dant's father testified that the $18,500 
downpayment and the other cash gifts giv-
en during the marriage were solely for his 
son, plaintiff testified that she always be-
lieved the gifts were for both parties. In 
addition, both defendant and his father tes-
tified that, with one exception, the gifts 
were made in the form of checks made 
payable jointly to both defendant and plain-
tiff. The one check that was made out to 
defendant only was made at about the time 
of the parties' separation. The trial judge 
stated from the bench that the past history 
of gift giving as compared to the gift given 
at the time of the separation indicated that 
defendant's father intended the previous 
gifts to be for both parties. In light of the 
evidence in the record, the court's finding 
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that the cash gifts were intended for both 
parties is not clearly erroneous. Thus, 
Mortensen, which sets forth a test for gifts 
given to one spouse during the marriage, is 
inapplicable. Further, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's decision not to 
award defendant those gifts. 
IV. INTEREST 
Defendant also claims the trial court 
failed to award him interest on his eq-
uitable lien on the Chris Lane property 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 
(1986). 
[7,8] According to section 15-1-4 
(1986), all judgments, other than those ren-
dered on a lawful contract, shall bear inter-
est at the rate of 12% per annum. In 
addition, the trial court in a divorce pro-
ceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of 
interest on a judgment for unpaid child 
support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905, 
906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable 
hen, nnhke a judgment, only gives the lien-
holder a right to collect the debt out of the 
charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks 
Bldg., N. V., 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A 
judgment, on the other hand, is "the final 
consideration and determination of a court 
on matters submitted to it in an action or 
proceeding." Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 
332, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (1968). 
[9] The decree awarded plaintiff exclu-
sive use and occupancy of the Chris Lane 
home subject to a non-interest bearing eq-
uitable lien in favor of defendant for one-
half of the present equity in the home. 
The court stated that the lien amount 
should be $22,500 and should be paid to 
defendant when plaintiff remarries, cohab-
its, sells the home, moves from the home, 
or when the youngest child reaches the age 
of majority, whichever occurs first The 
equitable hen awarded defendant has not 
yet been reduced to judgment. Thus, de-
fendant was awarded an equitable lien to 
which interest does not attach under sec-
tion 15-1-4. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's award to defendant of a non-inter-
est bearing equitable lien on the parties' 
property for $22,500. 
A-7 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
[10] Finally, defendant maintains the 
trial court erred in awarding plaintiff attor-
ney fees because there was insufficient 
evidence of need and reasonableness. To 
recover attorney fees in a divorce proceed-
ing, the movant must demonstrate that the 
award is reasonable and that the need of 
the requesting party compels the award. 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). Factors for determin-
ing reasonableness include the necessity 
for the number of hours utilized, the rea-
sonableness of the rate charged in light of 
the difficulty of the case and the result 
accomplished and the rates commonly 
charged for similar services in the commu-
nity. Id. 
[11] In this case, there is sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate plaintiffs need, given 
her income and financial responsibilities. 
In addition, plaintiffs attorney profferred 
that he had been practicing in the area of 
domestic relations law for fifteen years and 
was familiar with the rates charged in do-
mestic actions. He also stated that his 
hourly rate was $100 per hour and he con-
sidered that to be reasonable. He itemized 
the rates charged for associates, paralegals 
and clerks and stated that those rates were 
reasonable in his professional opinion. 
Plaintiffs attorney reviewed his time 
records and estimated the total fee and 
cost award would be $7,869.30. The court 
found that plaintiffs evidence of attorney 
fees in the amount of $7,879.30 was reason-
able and necessary. The court further 
found that plaintiff does not have the abili-
ty to pay the fees and that defendant has 
the ability to pay a portion of plaintiffs 
fees and costs. Finally, the court found 
that the hourly rate is reasonable and con-
sistent with the rate for similar services in 
the community and the hours expended 
were necessary. 
In hght of the evidence \n the record, we 
find sufficient evidence of reasonableness 
and need regarding the attorney fees. Ac-
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ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
REHEARING STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
This matter is before the court pursuant 
to plaintiffs petition for rehearing. Plain-
tiff claims she is entitled to attorney fees 
and costs on appeal 
[12] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) 
provides that this court may order either 
party to pay attorney fees incurred, includ-
ing attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). Before a court will award 
attorney fees, the trial court must find the 
requesting party is in need of financial 
assistance and that the fees requested are 
reasonable. Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 
P.2d 1057, 1061 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
[13] Defendant claims plaintiff has suf-
ficient means to pay her attorney fees in-
curred on appeal in light of the court's 
finding that plaintiff is capable of finding 
good, gainful employment, the award of 
alimony and child support, and the property 
distribution. However, the trial court 
found that plaintiff did not have the ability 
to pay her attorney fees incurred at trial 
and that defendant should pay a portion of 
plaintiffs attorney fees. Because those 
findings are supported by the evidence we 
award plaintiff her costs and reasonable 
attorney fees incurred on appeal and re-
mand to the trial court for a determination 
of reasonable attorney fees plaintiff has 
incurred on appeal. 
All concur. 
( O f KEY HUMBIK SYSTIM> 
Kevin Jon NIELD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890465-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 28, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted of burglary 
of business after jury trial in the Fourth 
District Court, Millard County, Cullen Y. 
Christensen, J. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) 
bolt cutters seized from defendant's apart-
ment in course of carrying out search for 
items specified in valid warrant, were law-
fully seized pursuant to plain view doctrine 
and, thus, were properly admissible, and (2) 
defendant's Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion right was not abridged by trial court's 
admission of edited version of codefend-
ant's confession which made no reference 
whatsoever to defendant's existence. 
Affirmed. 
1. Searches and Seizures <5=>149 
Bolt cutters seized from defendant's 
apartment in course of carrying out search 
for items specified in valid warrant were 
lawfully seized pursuant to plain view doc-
trine, and thus, were properly admissible in 
trial on charge of burglary of business, 
where bolt cutters were in plain view in 
part of defendant's apartment in which po-
lice were authorized by warrant to search 
for other specified items, and bolt cutters 
were clearly incriminating in that burglary 
had been accomplished by cutting medium 
link chain on door to gain entry. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>149 
In course of carrying out search for 
items specified in valid warrant, other 
items not so listed may be lawfully seized 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, : PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, 
Plaintiff, : SANCTIONS AND OTHER RELIEF 
v. : 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : Case No. D87-4967 
Defendant. : Judge Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
Plaintiff by her attorney Kent M. Kasting, hereby moves 
the Court for an Order as follows: 
1. Awarding plaintiff a judgment against defendant in 
the amount of $6,930.53 together with interest, representing 
$6,750.00 for additional child support and alimony arrearages 
accruing since the last hearing in this matter in November, 1990, 
plus $180.53 representing defendant's one-half share of medical 
expenses incurred for the parties1 children; 
2. Finding defendant in contempt of court for his 
willful and contemptuous refusal to abide the orders of this 
Court in regard to his child support and alimony obligations, his 
failure to pay previously ordered judgments for attorney's fees 
and costs, and his repeated violation and disregard of the 
A-q f\ r\ r\ A 
restraining orders set forth in paragraph 4 of the Decree of 
Divorce and subsequent recommendations and orders, and imposing 
appropriate sanctions against defendant for said actions of 
contempt, including a specified term in the Salt Lake County 
Jail; 
3. Awarding plaintiff her attorney's fees and costs 
in the bringing of this Motion before the Court; 
4. Such other relief as the Court deems appropriate 
in the circumstances. 
This Motion is more fully supported by the following 
facts and circumstances: 
1. A hearing was held in this matter in November, 
1990, before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Commissioner, in 
which she recommended plaintiff be awarded total judgments 
against defendant in the sum of $22,438.10. Included in this 
judgment were child support and alimony arrearages accrued 
through November, 1990 of $11,678.26 together with interest. The 
detail of the amounts making up this total judgment is summarized 
on the attached Exhibit "A". Defendant rejrected that 
recommendation and a hearing on that rejection was held before 
the Honorable Homer Wilkinson on January 4, 1991. Judge 
Wilkinson ruled on that rejection. Plaintiff prepared an Order, 
and defendant objected to the same. No hearing has been held on 
those objections. 
A-\o 
r\ r\ r\ A r* +*i 
2. Since the November 1990 hearing before 
Commissioner Peuler, defendant has continued his blatant 
disregard of his obligations of child support and alimony as 























































Plaintiff requests judgment against defendant in the amount of 
$6,750 plus interest for these arrearages. 
3. Plaintiff has incurred additional medical expenses 
in 1991 for the parties' children in the total amount of $361.06 
as set forth in Exhibit "Bff attached hereto. Defendant has 
failed and refused to pay^  his one-half share in the amount of 
$180.53 and plaintiff requests judgment for that amount. 
A- l l 
4, Defendant has repeatedly demanded that certain 
items of personal property be given to him over and above those 
awarded him in the Decree. Plaintiff has attempted on several 
occasions to give these items to defendant but he has failed and 
refused to make arrangements for pick-up and transportation of 
these items. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a Statement of a 
police officer whom plaintiff had asked to come to her home to 
serve as a neutral witness and, if necessary, keeper of the peace 
on February 23, 1991, to be present during the appointed time 
period when defendant and plaintiff had agreed he could pick up 
his personal property. The Statement at Exhibit C sets forth 
that defendant never did show up, but called numerous times to 
demand that plaintiff bring the items to him, despite the fact 
that she explained to him that she did not have a truck or any 
means of transporting the items. Defendant does own a truck and 
had the means of picking up the items, but refused to do so, and 
ultimately never did show up. 
5. Defendant has repeatedly violated restraininq 
orders in the Decree of Divorce and in the Order issued by the 
Court following the November, 1990 hearing against him coming 
upon the residence of plaintiff and against threats and physical 
violence. Defendant has continued to violate these orders on 
numerous occasions, requiring the police to be called. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit flDff is a Report of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office describing a kidnapping and assault incident on 
4 
A 
June, 10, 1991• Plaintiff's father, Don Crawford, was driving 
the parties' children in his truck from plaintiff's home to his 
own when he passed defendant on the road near plaintiff's home. 
Defendant slammed on his brakes, jumped out of his own vehicle 
and then leaped into the back of Mr. Crawford's truck. He then 
proceeded to physically assault Mr. Crawford through an open 
window into the cab while Mr. Crawford was trying to drive. When 
Mr. Crawford stopped the car, defendant forced the children from 
the vehicle and forcibly took them with him. Despite 
intervention of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department, 
defendant refused to reveal the whereabouts of the children. He 
was subsequently arrested and booked on charges of felony kidnap 
assault. Defendant obviously has no regard for the safety or 
physical welfare of other persons, including his own children, 
and should be found in contempt of court for his repeated and 
willful violations and disregard of the restraining orders 
previously entered by this court. 
6. Defendant's attitude of contempt for the orders of 
this Court throughout the history of this case, and since the 
November, 1990 hearing, is blatant and shameless. Plaintiff 
requests the Court impose appropriate sanctions against 
defendant, including but not limited to sentencing him to an 
A-1? nnn.vrr. 
appropriate term in the County Jail for his contemptuous 
behavior. 
DATED this 1/ day of September, 1991. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, being first duly sworn 
under oath, deposes and says: 
She is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and 
has read the foregoing Motion and knows the contents thereof and 
that the same is true of her own knowledge, except as to those 
matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to 
those matters, she believes them to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this '^° day of 
S e p t e j ^ ^ . l ^ l , , , . . . . . . . . 
i ^SS5V Notary Pubflo J 
3 j 4Z fe«&L JENNIFER OLSON I 
I ^ G M W A 1501 So. Lincoln SL l 
I uA Hkfflr MM My Commission CJXXBS I 
3 V ® V March23.19ar I 







I hereby certify that on the day of September, 
1991, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Verified Motion to: 
Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe 
4850 South 2126 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Defendant Pro Se. 
fir& nnn^o 
SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT ENTERED NOVEMBER, 1990 
Child support and alimony arrearages 
September, 1988 - October, 1990 $10,928.26 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
through October, 1990 857.55 
Credit to Jerry for net amount owed 
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured 
medical expenses of children (56.59) 
Credit to Jerry for repair costs to 
his truck (150.00) 
Replacement value of VCR removed 
by Jerry from Jeanette's home 
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce) 300.00* 
Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89 
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce) 3,939.65 
Interest on Attorney's fee judgment 
@12% per annum through October, 1990 
($39.40 per month simple interest x 
20 months) 788.00 
Judgments for car rental fees $320 
and attorney's fees $200 
(Order, January 1989 520.00 
Interest on Judgments 1/89 
@12% interest = $5.20 per month 
for 21 months through October, 1990 109.20 
SUBTOTAL $17,236.07 
Appeal: Attorney's fees 3,820.00 
Costs 590.50 
Amounts accruing November, 1990 (see attachment) 891.53 
Credit to Jerry for skis sold at garage sale (100.00) 
TOTAL $22,438.10 
*Note: Since entry of the judgment, defendant has returned the 
VCR to plaintiff, and plaintiff is willing to credit $300 against 
the judgment for that item. 
A-\b 000473 
The following additional amounts were 
due by the end of November, 1990: 
Child support $600; Alimony $150 $750.00 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
for November: $11,678.26 x .0083 96.93 
Interest on attorney's fee judgment, Decree 3 9.40 
Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments 
1/89 Order 5 .20 
A ~ l l 
TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS, November, 1990 $891.53 
000474 
ADDITIONAL HEALTH EXPENSES PAID BY JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE 
SINCE JANUARY, 1991 
)ate Provider 
!/14/91 Dr. Swinyer (Jennifer, wart) 
1/14/91 University Pharmacy (wart) 
/6/91 Dr. Morgan (John, dental) 
3/25 
76/91 Dr. Morgan (Jennifer, dental) 
: 3/25 
/4/91 Osco Drug (Julie, Rx) 
/25/91 Dr. Morgan (Jeff, dental) 
/2 5/91 Dr. Morgan (Jennifer, dental) 
718/91 Dr. Homer Smith (Jennifer) 
71/91 Utah Optical (Jennifer) 
X)TALS 
?OTAL HEALTH EXPENSES PAID BY JEANETTE 
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Hense Classffloadon A Typo of Offense: 
PERS./SOCIEtY *SEE BELOW 
Oate of Occurrence: 
""06 I TO | | l 
Time of Occurrence: 
1902 
Idress of Occurrence: 
1760 East 7000 South (Fort Union Blvd.) 
Name of Bust •(S/^riFwrini Phone Number: (N/G) 
imp: 
X 
Victim J Last Name: 
OSGUTHORPE 
dress: 


























no middle initial given, 
ris Lane, residence phone: 
DOB: 06-29-49, Caucasian male, address: 
943-5610. 
/EVANNS. Snnrira. 
7031 South Chri 
^no middle initial given, DOB: 04-15-48, Caucasian female, address: 
s Lane, residence phone: 943-5610. 
VICTIM: 
•, 
(Assault victim) CRAWFORD, Don W.. DOB: 07-20-23, Ca 
dress: 5466 Wood Crest Drive, Hurray, Utah, phone #: 
C ucasian male, residence ad-
278-0072. 
V 
(Victim of kidnap) OSGUTHORPE, Jeff, age 14, Caucasian male, address: 7049 South 
Chris Lane, phone #i y4^-4Uyb. 
(Victim of kidnap) OSGUTHORPE, John, age 13, same address and phone number. 
(Victims of kidnap) twin sisters, OSGUTHORPE, Julie and Jennifer, ages 10 years, 
same address and phone number as listea aoove. 
/H) 
ARRESTEE: 
SRl/THORPF. Jprrv S DOR: 11-15-51, Caucasian male, residence address: 2126 East 
"0 South, Holiday,"Utah 84117, home phone: 278-8675. Subject is a veterinarian, 
is co-owner of Osguthorpe Animal Hospital at 4696 Highland Drive, also the location 
of the arrest. Subject was arrested 06-10-91 at 2015 hours, he was transported to 
the Salt Lake County Jail, arriving there at 2054 hours, and was booked in on the 
following charges: 1) kidnapping, Utah Code 76-5-301.1 paragraph 1 and 2, 2) 
Assault, Utah Code 76-5-102. Charges will be files via a fax sheet through the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. Referred to a District Court. 
A /n % f/S y\ -^ v *. < 









The complainant, Jeanette Osguthorpe, indicates that her father, Don Crawford, 
arrived home at about 6:45 p.m. on this date with the eldest of her children, 
Jeff Osguthorpe, from a fishing trip. She was getting ready to leave for a wed-
ding reception, and at the suggestion of her father, it was determined that all 
of the children would go with him to his residence for a couple of hours, while 
she was away. Jeanette was leaving the residence in company with Randy Evanns 
and his wife, Sondra Evanns, in their car; and Mr. Crawford, with the children, 
in his pick up truck. 
They were northbound on Chris Lane. At the intersection of Chris Lane and Fort 
Union Blvd. (1760 East), they observed the Arrestee, Jerry Osguthorpe, in his 
white Dodge pick up, Utah Listing 9288 BF, approaching that intersection. He 
slammed on his brakes, jumped out of his vehicle, and jumped into the back end of 
the pick up belonging to Mr. Crawford, and being driven by Mr. Crawford. They 
did not know exactly what was happening, and Mr. Crawford turned and went east-
bound on Fort Union Blvd. 
Mr. Evans was driving his vehicle and had turned to go westbound on Fort Union 
Blvd., when they observed Mr. Osguthorpe climbing into the back of the Crawford 
vehicle. They immediately returned to the Evanns residence where Jeanette ran 
Into the Evanns residence, and called the Sheriff's Office for assistance. 
Just prior to my arrival at the Evanns residence at 7301 South Chris La?3, Mr. 
Crawford had arrived back, and he was alone in his pick up. He told a stery or 
relayed information to me indicating that the suspect, Jerry Osguthorpe,"Had 
jumped into the back of his pick up, and forced the rear sliding windowJ^to the 
cab open. Through that window, Mr. Osguthorpe was assaulting Mr. Crawfcmd by 
hitting him on the side of the face, and on the arms, trying to get him « stop 
the vehicle. The assault became so intense, that Mr. Crawford finally f£3 to 
stop his vehicle, and did so near the entrance of Dan's Food parking lot^an the 
Highland Drive side. He was northbound at that time on Highland Drive, -flr. 
Crawford indicated that he was unable to safely drive the vehicle because of the 
assault being perpetrated on him by Mr. Osguthorpe. Mr, Crawford then indicates 
that Mr. Osguthorpe, through the back window, reached far enough to unlock the 
right front door of the pick up truck, and when the vehicle came to a stop along-
side the road, he jumped out, and forced, or pulled his children from Mr. 
Crawfords' vehicle. He then herded them, and made them run across Highland 
Drive, westbound, through the Highland Plaza, or Highland Point strip mall 
0001479 
'fiEPSTY CLEMENTS blj D.P.# 314 
Report Date: 
«*06| °<U| »i ""111 9^1 P«09. o». 
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NARRATIVE CONTINUATION SHEET aMrlALftEMftT D FOLLOW-UP 
91-54848 
parking lot, and continued westbound, running with the children. Mr. Crawford 
yelled after them to stop, and that he would take them back to Mr. Osguthorpe's 
vehicle, however, they did not stop. Mr. Crawford indicates that the children 
were indeed very frightened, and did not appear to want to go with their father. 
Mr. Crawford returned to Chris Lane and found his daughter standing out at 7031 
South Chris Lane, at the Evanns residence, and that's where I made contact with 
them. Mrs. Osguthorpe provided information regarding the license plate on her 
husbands Oodge vehicle, and also another vehicle he owns, a GMC van, Utah Listing 
4737 CC. She also gave me an address for Mr. Osguthorpe as being 4050 South 2126 
East. That was determined to not be a correct address. Getting directions from 
her, I found the correct address to be 2126 East 4850 South. At that location, 
contact was made with the current Mrs. Osguthorpe, and she indicated that Jerry 
and the children had left town, and were in route to Delta. 
If felt that the current Mrs.Osguthorpe was not telling me the truth, so I went 
to the Osguthorpe Animal Hospital at 4696 South Highland Drive, and did indeed 
find the GMC customized van parked in a driveway on the west end of the 
building. I waited in my car for a period of time to observe any movement inside 
the building, however, all the blinds were shut, and I could not see into the 
building. Mr. Osguthorpe, the suspect and arrestee, exited through a passage 
door in the basement of the building, and saw me parked in front of his van. He 
momentarily started back into the building, and then hesitated, and came back 
out, and started walking towards me. As we met, I confronted him with the 
question about where the children were. He indicated that he wasn't going to 
tell me where the children were, and that they were alright. At that point in 
time, I indicated to Mr. Osguthorpe that charges were being filed against him for 
an assault, and for custodial interference; the assault charges being filed by 
his ex-father-in-law, and the custodial interference charges being filed by his 
ex-wife, Jeanette Osguthorpe. I also indicated to him that it was imperative at 
this point in time that I make contact with the children to determine their well 
being and welfare. He refused to do this, consequently I arrested Mr. Osguthorpe 
at that location at approximately 2015 hours. Deputies from the Eastside Patrol 
Division had arrived, and were assisting me with the situation. 
I requested presence from the shift supervisor, Sergeant Dennis Coleman, and we 
discussed the situation, and were going over statutes of the Utah State Code 
Book. It appeared to us from the circumstances that we had been informed of that 
a more appropriate charge at this time would probably be the kidnapping qfcarge, 
as stated in the Utah Code 76-5-301.1, specifically paragraphs one and twff. The 
circumstances mentioned being the forceful nature with which Mr. Osguthorpa chose 
to take custody of his children on this date. We both felt that he not only 
endangered the lives of his children and his ex-father-in-law, but also M>s own 
life in the irrational actions that he took of jumping into the Crawford^jehicle, 
and assaulting Mr. Crawford as he was driving that vehicle on Fort Union~|lvd. 
Subsequently, I transported Mr. Jerry Osguthorpe to the Salt Lake County^Jail and 
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graphs one and two; and also booked him on the assault charge, using Utah Code 
76-5-102. A County Attorney's fact sheet is being submitted. I also filled out 
a no warrant arrest fact sheet at the Salt Lake County Jail, indicating these 
circumstances surrounding the arrest of Mr. Osguthorpe. Based on the information 
I received from the witnesses, the complainant, and Mr. Crawford, the victim, I 
felt comfortable in making this type of an arrest. 
When I made contact with the children at the veterinary clinic, I also asked them 
whether or not they had voluntarily gone with their father. The eldest, Jeff, 
Indicated that no, they had not gone voluntarily with him, and that they were 
aware it was not his time to have them for visitation. They said they didn't 
necessarily want to go to Delta with him for the next couple of days, which he 
indicated he was going to do. The two little girls were especially frightened, 
and indicated that they were afraid because of the irrational behavior they had 
seen in their father. All four of the children also indicated that contrary to 
what Mr. Osguthorpe said, he did strike and hit Mr. Crawford while Mr. Crawford 
was driving the vehicle. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN RE: 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS, 
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC. 
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, 
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF 
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
CONTEMPT CITATION 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written 
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt 
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and 
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for 
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on 
kl& 
Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart, 
Adamson & Kasting. The defendant was present and represented 
himself pro se. The parties presented testimony and documentary 
evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. 
Each party was sworn and testified under oath. The Court 
reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents 
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the 
premises. The Court issued its ruling from the bench and now in 
connection with that ruling now makes the following Findings of 
Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. NOTICE. Both parties had proper notice of these 
proceedings and the Court has jurisdiction over each of these 
parties. Defendant had the opportunity for a full hearing on 
Plaintiff's Request for Contempt. 
2. OBLIGATIONS UNDER DECREE OF DIVORCE. The defendant at 
all times knew and understood the obligations imposed upon him 
under Js 4, 6, 7 and 15 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this 
matter. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY. Disputes as to the exchanges of 
personal property have arisen between the parties in the past and 
those disputes have not been able to be voluntarily resolved by 
the parties. Any such disputes are independent from, and not 
related to, the defendant's ongoing obligations to pay plaintiff 
2 
Plaintiff has in the past attempted to make arrangements for the 
orderly exchange of this property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. The defendant 
has challenged plaintiff's claims for reimbursement of medical 
and dental expenses not covered by insurance. Those unreimbursed 
expenses through January 4, 1991 were reduced to judgment in 
connection with previous hearings held before the Commissioner 
and this Court. With regard to unreimbursed medical and dental 
expenses incurred after January 4, 1991 through September 25, 
1991, the date of the filing of plaintiff's last Motion, 
plaintiff stated she would not seek reimbursement from defendant 
for the same. 
5. UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
a. Defendant has failed to pay ongoing child support 
and alimony for considerable periods of time (See plaintiff's 
Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5). Between December 1990 and January 1992, 
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child support, $2,100 in 
alimony (total $10,500 plus accrued interest). Defendant paid 
$750 leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for January, 1992.) No child support has 
been paid since February, 1991. 
b. Defendant and his current wife both testified "He 
would pay child support if his personal items were returned". 
c. Defendant further testified the plaintiff had 
plenty of money and could sell one of her houses. 
3 
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d. Defendant has not demonstrated good faith in 
connection with attempting to pay his ongoing support 
obligations. 
e. Defendant testified he was paying his new wife $500 
per month rent in order to reside with her in a home she recently 
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
f. Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of 
15 years and testified he earned $5.00 per hour in connection 
with consultation he claimed he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal 
Hospital- Defendant had and has the means to pay child support. 
g. The credibility of the defendant and his present 
wife is lacking. Both refused to answer questions on the stand. 
Both were evasive. The defendant did not answer questions 
truthfully. 
h. The defendant's failure to pay his support 
obligations as previously ordered was done willfully, voluntarily 
and with full knowledge of those obligations as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
6. CONTEMPT. The Court finds the defendant is in contempt 
of this Court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended), in that he has been disobedient of lawful 
judgments, orders and processes of this Court. The defendant had 
the opportunity to have a full hearing and evidence has been 
taken regarding that contempt. The defendant has not answered 
the questions put to him truthfully. The Court specifically 
finds that this is one of the most flagrant violations of the law 
4 
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as far as support of children that has come before this Court, in 
that the defendant owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid 
child support alone. Defendant is further in contempt for his 
failure to pay alimony and attorneys fees as previously ordered 
by the Court. 
7. ATTORNEYS FEES. 
a. The defendant has paid nothing towards the 
attorneys fees he was previously ordered to pay by this Court in 
connection with the trial of this matter and his subsequent 
appeal of this Court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
b. The plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees and costs 
in connection with this hearing and will be required to pay those 
fees. 
c. Plaintiff does not have the financial means to pay 
her fees. 
d. Plaintiff's counsel bills at the rate of $125 per 
hour. That rate is consistent with rates charged in the 
community for domestic relations work. Plaintiff's counsel 
expended in excess of 7 hours in connection with preparation for 
and attendance at the hearing. The rate charged and hours 
expended are reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff's counsel 
requested an award of $875 in attorneys fees. 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER, Defendant's 
Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt 
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are 
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as 
proposed and without modification. 
2. DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991. Defendant's Rejection of 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is 
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except 
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she 
agreed to relinquish. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE. Any personal property to be 
exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the 
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present. 
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property 
to which he may be entitled. Following that exchange the issue 
of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely 
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal 
property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. Plaintiff's 
claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred 
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to 
6 
Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those 
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff by 
stipulation has waived her right to seek reimbursement from 
defendant for the children's medical and dental expenses from 
January 4, 1991 through September 25, 1991, the date which she 
filed her motion seeking such reimbursement. 
5. JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. Plaintiff 
is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750, 
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid 
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January 
1992. This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for 
unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court. 
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES. Plaintiff is granted judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This 
judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys 
fees previously entered by the Court. 
7. SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT. The Court imposes the following 
sanctions on defendant for his contempt: 
a. The defendant is fined $200. 
b. The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
c. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to 
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and 
ability to perform. He shall continue to serve the time in jail 
until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court. 
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d. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion 
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community 
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual 
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance 
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children, 
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so. 
e. The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a 
period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992. If by that time 
defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support 
arrearages reduced to judgment in 55 above. If he fails to pay 
the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report 
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If 
he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his 
arrest. 
f. Further, in addition to and independent of the 
requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall 
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely 
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and 
$300 towards support arrearages). Should defendant not make 
these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail 
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence 
serving such sentence. This $900 monthly payment shall continue 
until all child support arrearages have been paid. It shall be 
in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to 
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce. 
8 
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g. Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has 
been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in 5s (e) 
and (f) above. 
DATED this J- \ day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
.HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/District Court Judge 
Approved as to Substance and Form: 
l(islr 
a.. 
-6*£Rent M. Kasting Date 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
h'%?? 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \< day of January, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law In Re: Hearing on Defendant's Objections to 
Plaintiff's Written Order and Judgements Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Contempt Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and 
Defendant's Objections to Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations 
Related to Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt 
Order, Sanctions, and Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and 
Plaintiff's Request for Contempt Citation and accompanying 
transcript of Ruling from bench, was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
6808 Courtland Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, UT 84117 
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Third Judicial District 
By. 
JAN 2 4 1992 
U"ipa»y Clerk 
KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH Cl^lSU^ 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN RE: 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS, 
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC. 
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, 
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF 
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
CONTEMPT CITATION 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written 
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt 
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and 
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for 
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on 
k-%Cr> 
Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart, 
Adamson & Kasting. The defendant was present and represented 
himself pro se. The parties presented testimony and documentary 
evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. 
Each party was sworn and testified under oath. The Court 
reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents 
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the 
premises. The Court issued its ruling from the bench and has 
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the 
foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER. Defendant's 
Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt 
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are 
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as 
proposed and without modification. 
2. DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991. Defendant's Rejection of 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is 
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except 
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she 
agreed to relinquish. 
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3. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE, Any personal property to be 
exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the 
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present. 
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property 
to which he may be entitled. Following that exchange the issue 
of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely 
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal 
property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. Plaintifffs 
claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred 
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to 
Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those 
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff 
has waived her right to seek reimbursement from defendant for the 
children's medical and dental expenses from January 4, 1991 
through September 25, 1991, the date which she filed her motion 
seeking such reimbursement. 
5. JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. Plaintiff 
is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750, 
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid 
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January 
1992. This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for 
unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court. 
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES. Plaintiff is granted judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This 
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judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys 
fees previously entered by the Court. 
7. SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT. The Court imposes the following 
sanctions on defendant for his contempt: 
a. The defendant is fined $200. 
b. The defendant is ordered to serve 3 0 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
c. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to 
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and 
ability to perform. He shall continue to serve the time in jail 
until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court. 
d. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion 
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community 
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual 
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance 
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children, 
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so. 
e. The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a 
period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992. If by that time 
defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support 
arrearages reduced to judgment in ^5 above. If he fails to pay 
the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report 
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If 
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he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his 
arrest. 
f. Further, in addition to and independent of the 
requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall 
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely 
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and 
$3 00 towards support arrearages). Should defendant not make 
these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail 
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence 
serving such sentence. This $900 monthly payment shall continue 
until all child support arrearages have been paid. It shall be 
in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to 
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce. 
g. Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has 
been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in fls (e) 
and (f) above. 
DATED this ) ~ "j day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
/HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
Date 
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Approved as to Substance and Form: 
a. 
*^«_ Kent M. Kasting 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment In Re: 
Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written Order 
and Judgements Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt Order, 
Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and 
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for 
Citation and accompanying transcript of Ruling from bench was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
6808 Courtland Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, UT 84117 
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LAW O F F I C E S 
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SUITE I 3 3 0 
B L. DART. P C. TELEPHONE 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON. P C 3 lO SOUTH MAIN <eO<l S 2 f « 3 a a 
KCNTMKAST.NO. p.c t S A L T L A K E CITY. U T A H 8 4 I O I r „ , e o . , S S S M U 
SHARON A. DONOVAN. P C * 
JOHN O SHEAFFER. JR OT COUNSEL 
ERIC P. LEE J O H N T E V A N S PC 
SHANNON W CLARK OAVlO E ROSS II 
TALSO ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IS ~~Z STATE O r MONTANA 
•ALSO ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IS " - £ STATE OP WASHINGTON 
March 5, 1992 
Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe 
4850 South 2126 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Dr. Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, UT 84117 
RE: Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, Civil No. 874904967 
Dear Dr. Osguthorpe: 
I just received a telephone call from Jeannette and she 
advised me that she had received a check from you for $500, 
representing partial payment towards your February support 
obligation. I have advised her to cash that check, inasmuch as she 
needs those monies to support the children. That is not intended, 
in any way to be a waiver on our part or a consent to any reduced 
payment by you. 
As you are aware, you are under Order to pay the sum of $900 
per month towards child support, in addition to other ongoing 
alimony obligation. If Jeannette has not received an additional 
$400 check by close of business March 9, we will immediately ask 
the Court for imposition of the jail sentence which the Court 
stayed, provided you made the payments ordered by the Court. Please 
govern yourself accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
/en 
KMK/kw 
pc. Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Jeanette Osguthorpe 
A-AI A n A r n n 
KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
of Counsel to 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 ^ ^ 7 ; 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, : PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S 
Plaintiff, : FEES AND IMMEDIATE 
IMPOSITION OF JAIL SENTENCE 
v, : 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : Civil No. 874904967 
Defendant. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and moves the court for the 
following relief against defendant: 
1. For the immediate imposition on the defendant of 
the 3 0 day jail sentence previously stayed by the Court. 
2. For an additional judgment of $1,400.00 against 
the defendant representing unpaid child support for the months of 
February, March, April and Mciy, 1992, plus any additional amounts 
which accrue until this matter is heard. 
3. For an additional judgment against defendant in 
the sum of $600,00 representing unpaid alimony for the months of 
February, March and April of 1992, plus any additional amounts 
which accrue until this matter is heard. 
4. For additional attorney's fees of not less than 
$500. 
A-42-
5. For such other and further relief as may be 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
As grounds for this Motion plaintiff represents to the 
Court as follows: 
1. On the 28th day of January, 1992, this Court 
entered an Order against the defendant which provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
e. The jail sentence ordered above may 
be stayed for a period of 6 days or until 
January 13, 1992- If by that time defendant 
has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the 
child support arrearages reduced to judgment 
in 55 above. If he fails to pay the $5,000 
by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to 
report to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 
noon, January 14, 1992. If he does not so 
report, a bench warrant will be issued for 
his arrest. 
f. Further, in addition to and 
independent of the requirements in the 
preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall 
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to 
plaintiff in a timely fashion the sum of $900 
per month ($600 regular child support and 
$3 00 towards support arrearages). Should 
defendant not make these monthly payments as 
ordered, then the stay of the jail sentence 
shall be lifted and he shall immediately 
commence serving such sentence. This $900 
monthly payment shall continue until all 
child support arrearages have been paid. It 
shall be in addition to the $150 monthly 
alimony payment he is required to pay 
plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce. 
2. On January 13, 1992 defendant paid to plaintiff 
the $5,000 which he was ordered to pay as was provided above. 
3. Defendant has not paid the child support he was 




Regular on Arrearage Total Total 
Month Child Support as Ordered Due Paid 
February, 1992 $600 $300 $900 $500 
March 600 300 900 500 
April 600 300 900 -0-
May 600 300 900 -0-
TOTAL $2,400 $1,200 $3,600 $1,000 
Plaintiff is entitled to an additional judgment against the 
defendant in the total sum of $1,400.00 ($100 February, $100 
March, $600 April and $600 May). 
4. Defendant has not paid the $150 per month alimony 
he was ordered to pay for th€> months of February, March, April 
and May, 1992, and plaintiff is entitled to the additional 
judgment of $600 representing those unpaid alimony installments. 
5. Plaintiff has been required to again retain the 
services of an attorney (defendant has paid nothing toward any of 
the numerous previous ciwards of attorney's fees made by the Court 
against him) and a reasonable fee to be awarded in connection 
with this matter is the* sum of not less than $500. 
6. Defendant has again wilfully and intentionally 
violated the previous Orders of this Court and, therefore, is 
once again in blatant contempt of this Court's previous Orders 
and it is reasonable that he should be ordered to immediately 
commence serving the entire 30 day jail sentence which the Court 
had earlier imposed upon him but stayed conditioned upon his 
complying with the payments the Court required him to make to the 
A--44 U \j VJ <J v. 
plaintiff and the Court should issue a bench warrant requiring 
the defendant to commence serving that jail sentence forthwith. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for the relief requested 
above and for such other and further relief as may be appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
DATED this Z>0 —day of April, 1992. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
\^/KENT A. KASTING 
A Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Jeannette C. Osguthorpe, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
That she is the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter 
and has read the foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Motion for 
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail 
Sentence and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true 
of her own knowedge except as to those matters therein stated 
upon information and belief, and, as to those matters, she 
believes them to be true. 
(Ly/UX 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
, 1992. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 0 day of April, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail 
Sentence was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
6808 Courtland Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, UT 84117 
A~AI~ 000592 
• - en 
Dl.iTq : •bFP 
KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
of counsel to 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : Civil No. 874904967 
Defendant. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
000O000 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff's Verified Motion for 
Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate Imposition of Jail 
Sentence will come on for hearing on the 18th day of May, 1992, 
at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of 
the above-entitled court. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 1992. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Rent M. Kasti 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
A^ nn05P.3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^X^Iday of May, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
6808 Courtland Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, UT 84117 
L^A& ~^nr:n/l 
Third Judicial District 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE 
v. : 
: Civil No. 874904967 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, : 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. : 
oOo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe, after being first duly 
sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I appeared before the above-entitled Court on May 18, 
1992, on my Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Immediate 
Imposition of Jail Sentence. 
3. Pursuant to the Court's ruling, the Court imposed a jail 
sentence of thirty days for my ex-husband, Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, 
if he did not pay $2,000.00 to me by May 26, 1992, at 12:00 o'clock 
noon, and Bench Warrant would issue at that time. 
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4. Further, the Court also ordered that the child support 
through the month of June, 1992, would also need to be paid; 
otherwise, a Bench Warrant would issue. 
5. I did not receive the $2,000.00 ordered to be paid by May 
26, 1992, at 12:00 o'clock noon. 
6. I am asking that the Court issue a Bench Warrant, 
pursuant to the Court's Order, to impress upon Defendant his 
obligation to meet the terms of the Decree of Divorce and 
subsequent Orders. 
DATED this / day of June, 1992. 
ANETTE CRAWFORD^OSGUTHORP 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 day of June, 
1992. 
^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 7 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Ut, 
Notary Public 
SuftUktOty. Utah 841 c 
My Commission Expires 
^January IS, 1993 
Slate 61 Utah 
A K.n 000598 
SHARON A. DONOVAN, 0901 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: 521-6383 
( . t . - U J . 
.Thinri.hiclfoiF.i D.'slric-
JUN \ s 1992 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
ans3as 
ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT 
IN CONTEMPT AND IMPOSING 
JAIL SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No- 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, attorneys' fees and 
immediate imposition of jail sentence came on regularly for 
hearing on May 18, 1992 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through Sharon A. Donovan on 
behalf of Kent M. Kasting, and Defendant appearing pro se, and 
the Court having heard evidence and during the proceedings having 
received documentary evidence regarding Defendant's income, 
Defendant's Exhibit Nos- 1 and 2. 
Pursuant to such hearing an Order was entered by the Court 
on June 5, 1992 finding the defendant in contempt and imposing a 
jail sentence and judgment. Because of procedural irregularities 
-1-
the parties have stipulated that such Order should be withdrawn 
and that a new Order should be issued in Order to allow the 
defendant the opportunity to take appropriate action with 
reference to such Order. 
The Court considers itself very familiar with the file of 
this case, having had numerous proceedings before this Court 
prior to the above-referenced hearing. The Court has carefully 
listened to the profer and evidence of the parties and reviewed 
prior testimony of the parties regarding prior imposition of jail 
sentence and considers itself fully advised in the premises. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the Court having made and entered 
adequate and sufficient Findings of Fact, now, therefore, the 
Court being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court finds that this matter has been before this 
Court before, has been up to the Court of Appeals on one occasion 
and that Court has sustained this Court, and the Court finds the 
defendant's income, as he states, is just not realistic. 
2. The Court finds that the parties' children need to be 
supported and Defendant has failed to meet his obligations, 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
3. The Court sustains its previous order. The Court 
further orders that Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Salt 
Lake County Jail for a period of thirty days, and such longer 
time as the Court deems fit to impose sentence, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-32-12, if the acts performed as ordered by 
this Court are not fully complied with. However, the Court will 
-2-
stay its imposition of jail sentence, as long as the following 
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay this Order until the 
June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, at which time $3,050.00 shall be 
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent child 
support and alimony through June 1992 ($1,800.00 in child support 
through June 1992, and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992; and 
attorneys1 fees of $500.00 for purpose of these proceedings). If 
the the $3,050.00 is not paid by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a 
bench warrant shall issue, unless the defendant submits himself 
to the Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration. (b) The Court 
further orders that if the on-going child support and payment on 
arrearages of $900.00 per month due on the 5th day of July, 
1992 is not paid at that time, a bench warrant shall issue, 
unless Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the Salt Lake 
County Jail. (c) If Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the 
Salt Lake County Jail, he is ordered to inform this Court of 
such, so that the necessary paperwork can be taken care of. JiS&j 
Judgment shall enter against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff in 
the amount of $1,800.00 in delinquent child support through June 
1992; $750.00 in alimony through June 1992 and attorneys' fees of 
$500.00 for purposes of these proceedings, for a total judgment 
of $3,050.00. 
DATED this day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
/HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ District Judge 
-3-
Approved as to form: 
Craig sUCook 
Attorney for Defendant 
- 4 -
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff L\— _>*: 
310 South Main, Suite 13 3 0 7/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
WARRANT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
oOo 
TO ANY CONSTABLE OR ANY SHERIFF WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
WHEREAS, it appearing that Jerry S. Osguthorpe, the Defendant 
in the above-entitled action, has failed to obey previous orders of 
this Court directing him to pay to Plaintiff the amount of $900.00 
in delinquent child support through May, 1992; $600.00 in alimony 
through May, 1992; and attorney's fees of $500.00, for a total 
judgment of $2,000.00, and has further willfully and contemptuously 
ignored prior orders of this Court; and 
WHEREAS, the Court by its Order duly entered on the 3 ^ day 
o f
 ^}iwA, , 1992, adjudged and decreed that Jerry S. Osguthorpe 
was guilty of contempt of Court in failing to obey this Court's 
orders; 
OOQRiv 
NOW, THEREFORE, in obedience to an Order of the Court made and 
entered on the S> day of , 1992, you are 
commanded to take into your custody and commit to the Salt Lake 
County Jail Jerry S. Osguthorpe and to confine him therein for a 
period of thirty (30) days, or until such time as he shall purge 
himself of this Court's finding of contempt by fully cooperating 
with this Court's previous orders related to payment of the amount 
of $900.00 in delinquent child support through May, 1992; $600.00 
in alimony through May, 1992; and attorneyfs fees of $500.00, for 
a total judgment of $2,000.00 to Plaintiff, Jeannette C. 
Osguthorpe, and his child support payment (including arrearages) of 
$900.00 on June 5, 1992, or until he is otherwise legally 
discharged. 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to make due return of this Writ 
within days from the date hereof showing how you executed 
the same. 
DATED this o day of June, 1992. 




6808 Courtland Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Jerry Osguthorpe 
c/o Osguthorpe Veterinarian Clinic 
4 696 South Highland Drive 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
A J^/0 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
*•. -
 r
 • L ii ^ 
CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
Attorney for Defendant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 485-8123 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Jerry Silver Osguthorpe by and through his 
attorney hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the decision 
entered by the lower court on June 19, 1992. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992. 
Crai^jl. Cook 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Sharon A. 
Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 this 24th day of June, 1992. 
L 3 InnU 
Third .-.; District 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 13 30 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
DEC 0 3 1992 
Deputy Clerk 
V. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
•oOo 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and 
Other Related Matters came on regularly for hearing on October 9, 
1992, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, one of the Judges of 
the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in person and by and 
through her attorney, Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in 
person and being represented by his attorney, Craig S. Cook, and 
Plaintiff having been called as a witness on her Motion, and the 
Court having heard the testimony and reviewed the pleadings and 
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment shall enter against Defendant in the sum of 
$1,625.00, which represents $1,100.00 unpaid child support through 
A S~ /7 
the first half of October, 1992, and $525.00 alimony through the 
first half of October, 1992. 
2. The Court finds that Defendant has filed an appeal in the 
Utah Court of Appeals from the District Court's finding of 
contempt, has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Utah 
Supreme Court and further filed a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus 
against the Sherifffs Department, necessitating action and 
attorney's fees on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §30-3-3, this 
Court has the authority in divorce actions to grant fees as may be 
appropriate in this matter. Based thereon, the Court orders a 
judgment of $5,214.25 against Defendant for attorney's fees 
Plaintiff has reasonably incurred in defending the matters filed by 
Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and Federal Court. 
The Court further finds that the Court of Appeals specifically 
remanded to the trial Court the award of Appellee's costs and 
attorney's fees reasonably incurred in opposing the stay. The 
Court further finds that the judgment for attorney's fees in the 
Supreme Court of $3,196.60 and the Federal Court of $620.70 shall 
be awarded by way of judgment, unless the Federal Court or Supreme 
Court specifically indicate that it was their intention not to 
award attorney's fees to Plaintiff in this matter. The relief 
requested by Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Federal Court and 
Supreme Court have all been denied by those Courts. The Court 
2 
further finds that Defendant shall receive credit for time served 
from the previous jail sentence in this matter. 
The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have the 
ability to pay these fees and that these fees are reasonable, in 
light of the actions of Defendant, and that Defendant has the 
ability to pay said fees. The Court further finds that these fees 
are segregated as follows: 
Court of Appeals $1,396.95 
Supreme Court 3,196.60 
Federal Court 620.70 
Total: $5,214.25 
The Court further finds that judgment shall enter against 
Defendant in the sum of $300.00 for additional fees, for purposes 
of this hearing, for a total judgment for this hearing of 
$7,139.25. ^ 
DATED this v-3 day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
llads 
CRAIG \S}. COOK 
Attorney for Defendant 
i / ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the nfcr day of November, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Craig S. Cook, Esq, 
Attorney for Defendant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
It I 1 
EXHIBIT. £L 

























































































































































































TOTAL ACCRUED ARREARAGES THROUGH OCTOBER, 1990 $10,928.26 
PLUS SIMPLE INTEREST ACCRUED THROUGH OCTOBER, 1990 857.55 
TOTAL ARRREARAGES AND INTEREST DUE $11,785.81 
SUMMARY OF AMOUNTS OWED BY JERRY OSGUTHORPE 
Child support and alimony arrearages 
September, 1988 - October, 1990 $10,928.26 
(See Exhibit "A" attached to Motion) 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
through October, 1990 
(See calculations on Exhibit "A") 857.55 
Credit to Jerry for net amount owed 
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured 
medical expenses of children 
(See Exhibit «B" attached to Motion) (56.59) 
Credit to Jerry for repair costs to 
his truck (See paragraph 3 of Order 
and Judgment attached as Exhibit MCff) (150.00) 
Replacement value of VCR removed 
by Jerry from Jeanette9s home 
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce) 300.00 
Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89 
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce) 3,939.65 
Interest on Attorney's fee judgment 
@12% per annum through October, 1990 
($39.40 per month simple interest x 
20 months) 788.00 
Judgments for car rental fees $320 
and attorney's fees $200 
(See Order, January 1989 at 
Exhibit MCfl) 520.00 
Interest on Judgments 1/89 
§12% interest = $5.20 per month 
for 21 months through October, 1990 109.20 
SUBTOTAL $17,236.07 
Appeal: Attorneys fees 3,820.00 
Costs 590.50 
TOTAL $21,646.57 






The following additional amounts will 
be due by the end of November, 1990: 
Child support $600; Alimony $150 $750.00 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
for November: $11,678.26 x .0083 
Interest on attorneys fee judgment, Decree 
Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments 
1/89 Order 
TOTAL ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS, November, 1990 $891.53 
1 3 ^ n yW-Hi& 
9 6 . 
3 9 . 
5 . 
. 9 3 
. 4 0 
. 2 0 
SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT ENTERED NOVEMBER, 1990 
Child support and alimony arrearages 
September, 1988 - October, 1990 $10,928.26 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
through October, 1990 857.55 
Credit to Jerry for net amount owed 
by Jeanette to Jerry for uninsured 
medical expenses of children (56.59) 
Credit to Jerry for repair costs to 
his truck (150.00) 
Replacement value of VCR removed 
by Jerry from Jeanettef s home 
(Paragraph 13(A)(2) Decree of Divorce) 300.00* 
Attorney's fee judgment entered 3/1/89 
(Paragraph 14 Decree of Divorce) 3,939.65 
Interest on Attorney's fee judgment 
@12% per annum through October, 1990 
($39.40 per month simple interest x 
20 months) 788.00 
Judgments for car rental fees $320 
and attorney's fees $200 
(Order, January 1989 520.00 
Interest on Judgments 1/89 
@12% interest = $5.20 per month 
for 21 months through October, 1990 109.2 0 
SUBTOTAL $17,236.07 
Appeal: Attorney's fees 3,820.00 
Costs 590.50 
Amounts accruing November, 1990 (see attachment) 891.53 
Credit to Jerry for skis sold at garage sale (100.00) 
TOTAL $22,438.10 
*Note; Since entry of the judgment, defendant has returned the 
VCR to plaintiff, and plaintiff is willing to credit $300 against 
the judgment for that item. 
The following additional amounts were 
due by the end of November, 1990: 
Child support $600; Alimony $150 $750.00 
Interest on support/alimony arrearages 
for November: $11,678.26 x .0083 96.93 
Interest on attorneyfs fee judgment, Decree 39.40 
Interest on car rental/atty fee judgments 
1/89 Order 5.20 







































































Transcript of conversation 
between Jerry and Jeanette Osguthorpe 
Jerry: "God, I thought you were going to have my ass in 
jailf ha ha ha ha ha". 
Jeanette: "you know your in error1. 
Jerry: "Like hell, I'm not in error. Hell the judge 
hasn't even signed that last order. Christ, your 
attorney's taking you for a ride, Jeanette and 
you're going to end up paying the whole god damn 
bill for those attorneys. I'll tell you, you'll 
end up paying the whole thing couse it's gonna 
come out of the real assets that we have." 
Well, I'll tell you what, what about these kids 
that need new shoes, that have holes in their 
shoes..." 
By God, I'll take care of them, 
Well why don't you?' They don's even dare ask." 
If these kids need something you just send em 
over, I'll take care of them, I'll take custody 
of them. I'll do the whole god damn thing. 
You're not taking custody of them, you just pay 
your part and that will do the trick. 
Yeah, thats right, that's right, because you 
can't providefor them. 
I've provided for them. 
You can't provide for them. You can't take em ski 
racing. 
Yeah but they're happier 
Yeah 
You think you're a smart ass, don't ya? God, 
I'll tell you, you're gonna find out, By God 
it's like I told you at the start, if you want 
joint custody of these kids, let's just sign 
a joint custody and we'll go ahead and take care 
of them. 
Jeanette: Why don't you just pay your child support and 
we won't have a problem. I^plJj^ 












Jerry: Hell, I won't be paying any child support if 
I have joint custody. I'll fulfill my obli-
gation. 
Hell, That's not an obligation. How come the ORS 
(Office of Recovery Services) hasn't come after me 
Jeanette: It's a court order and you are responsible. 
Jerry: How come the ORS hasn't come after me? 
Jeanette: If it's a court order you are responsible for it. 
Jerry: You know what he told me during court, you heard 
what he said, come on in and we'll change it. 
Jeanette: No, He (Judge Wilkinson), said you were respon-
sible for every single penny of it, Jerry. 
Jerry: No well.. 
Jeanette: Yes he did. 
Jerry: Well, where is it? Where is it? How you gonna get 
it out of me, the money? 
Jeanette: It doesn't matter how I'm gonna get it out of you, 
If you can live with yourself .. 
Jerry: I can, I can 
This occurred Tuesday evening 7:00 P.M. on Mar. 27, 1991 
when Jerry came to return Jeff 

78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 282 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su 
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony: 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d» retention or removal of public officers; and 
<e> those matters described in Subsections 
(3 Ma* through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(11 The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3> The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repea led . 1988 
78-2-6. Appel la te court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
78-2-' Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Serv ice of sheriff to court . 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repea led . 
C H A P T E R 2a 








Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
— Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creat ion — Seal . 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. 1986 
78-2a-2. N u m b e r o f j u d g e s — T e r m s — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court o f A p p e a l s jur i sd ic t ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review oi; 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo~' 
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under*: 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
A-12-
<a appeals from the juvenile courts; 
<d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
<e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony: 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(ji appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court 
3> The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
•4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1992 
7S-2a-4. Review of act ions by S u p r e m e Court . 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be b> petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court 1986 
7S-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 




















Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist. 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-11. Repealed. 
State District Court Administrative 
System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-14. Repealed. 




78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and sta-
tistical data to administrator of the 
courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term 
— Compensation — Powers — Du-
ties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district 
court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications 
— Appointment — Functions gov-
erned by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repea led . 1971. 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Te rm of j u d g e s — Vacancy . 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
tially until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January, next following the date of 
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when court does not exist. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraor-
dinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into 
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies 
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to 
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district 
court in multiple judge districts or the district court 
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these 
cases may be made upon the court's own motion or 
upon the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, the court 
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit 
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit 
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and any 
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
rately under a decree of separate maintenance of 
any state for three consecutive years without co-
habitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection 
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under 
any provision for separate maintenance previously 
granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: d) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the laws 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a defense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant. For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3*3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money for the separate support and mainte-
nance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
1953 
30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Seal-
ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce may not be 
granted until both parties have attended a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court. The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determines course attendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties, 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties* sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
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commission, or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate 
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state 
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency, 
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or 
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules 
shall apply to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as 
established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- court" in Subdivision (a) and "administrative 
ment, effective October 1, 1992, substituted agency, commission, or board" for "tribunal" in 
"trial court" for "district, juvenile, or circuit Subdivision (b). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Kule 3. Appeal as ot right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify th§ 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
16 
A--7 0 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 4 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appel-
lant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1,1992, inserted "and a 
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-
cation by the clerk that the bond has been 
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Sub-
division (g). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Cited. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Post-judgment motions. 
In accord with fourth paragraph in bound 
volume. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 
P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for ail 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1^ 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Attorney fees. Premature notice. 
Cross-appeal. Reconsideration of order. 
Extension of time to appeal. Timeliness of notice. 
Filing of notice. —Date of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. Cited. 
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